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Abstract
We study the e￿ect of interbank market integration on small ￿rm ￿nance in the
build-up to the 2007-2008 ￿nancial crisis. We use a comprehensive data set that contains
contract terms on individual loans to 6,047 ￿rms across 14 European countries between
1998:01 and 2005:12. We account for the selection that arises in the loan request and
approval process. Our ￿ndings imply that integration of interbank markets resulted in
less stringent borrowing constraints and in substantially lower loan rates. The decrease
was strongest in markets with competitive banking sectors. We also ￿nd that in the
most rapidly integrating markets, ￿rms became substantially overleveraged during the
build-up to the crisis.
JEL classi￿cation: E51, G15, G21, G34
Keywords: interbank markets, selection, loan rates, bank competition, ￿rm leverage5
ECB




Financial integration is widely perceived to stimulate investment-based growth through a reduction in 
the cost of equity, bond, and bank financing. Little is known, however, about the effect the 
integration of interbank markets has on small firm finance. How does the degree and speed of 
interbank market integration affect the availability and cost of bank loans? And does rapid integration 
simply lead to cheaper firm financing, or does it also induce households and firms to take on 
excessive leverage? Given the freezing and subsequent partial disintegration of interbank markets 
after August 2007, and in order to make informed inferences about the effect of interbank market 
disfunctionality on the real economy, it is important to investigate how pre-crisis integration affected 
the financing of small and medium enterprises.  
In this paper, we estimate the effect of interbank market integration on small firm finance while 
taking into account the structure of credit markets. We focus on a sample of 6,047 firms from 14 
countries (10 new EU member states and 4 euro zone countries) between January 1998 and 
December 2005 taken from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). 
For the new EU member states, the sample period coincides with their rapid transition from 
"parochial" credit markets with mostly state-owned financial institutions to integrated credit markets 
populated by foreign-owned financial institutions with ready access to integrated euro-zone interbank 
markets. Interbank market integration in the euro area countries was almost complete at the 
beginning of the period, and so our data provides us with a control and a treatment group to estimate 
the effect of integration on small firm finance. We construct measures of both the degree and speed at 
which yields in all national interbank markets converge relative to yields in Germany, the country we 
take as our benchmark market, and relate convergence to bank loan rates and to firm leveraging. 
We find that interbank market integration alleviates credit constraints and decreases the loan rates 
charged to firms both in a statistically significant and economically relevant way. Numerically, a 
deepening of interbank market integration by two standard deviations would result in a decrease in 
loan rates by 121 basis points. If a euro zone country in the sample returns to its degree of interbank 
market integration in the last year prior to joining the euro, loan rates will, ceteris paribus, be almost 
60 basis points higher. These results are stronger in countries with a considerable degree of credit 
market competition. Our estimates hold regardless of whether we look at integration measures based 
on the convergence of nominal yields, or at integration measures based on cross-border interbank 
lending.  6
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At the same time, we find that lower loan rates may lead to excessive firm leverage. If for example 
integration increases by two standard deviations, the probability that a firm is overleveraged vis-à-vis 
the leverage of a similar benchmark firm increases between 10% and 13%. Our evidence thus points 
to one specific channel through which the European integration of the past decade contributed to both 
the growth and the vulnerability of the region's non-financial firms. 
One methodological contribution of the paper to the empirical banking literature is the utilization of 
data on non-applicant firm and rejected applicant firms to purge imminent selection bias. In our 
sample, about one third of the firms are either rejected or discouraged. Therefore, estimating the 
effect of integration on the rates of loans to firms which obtained bank credit ignores the bias induced 
by the non-randomness of the subsample of credit receiving firms. To address this issue, we use 
survey data on firms that applied for bank credit but were turned down, and on firms that stayed out 
of the application process because they were discouraged by high interest rates, high collateral 
requirements, and high rejection rates, distinguishing the latter from firms which stayed out of the 
application process because they were in good financial health.  
The paper serves to inform policy-makers further about the costs and benefits of the integration 
process. While the positive effect of integration in making bank loans cheaper and inducing firms to 
shift away from more expensive forms of finance is beyond doubt, our evidence also suggests that 
firms in markets which integrated too quickly may have taken on a higher share of bank debt than is 
natural, as implied by the financing pattern of benchmark firms. This suggests that many central and 
east European firms may have entered the 2007-2008 financial crisis overleveraged, partially due to 
the rapid pace of pre-crisis banking integration. 
 7
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1 Introduction
Financial integration is widely perceived to stimulate investment-based growth through a reduction
in the cost of equity, bond, and bank ￿nancing.1 Little is known, however, about the e￿ect the
integration of interbank markets has on small ￿rm ￿nance. How does the degree and speed of inter-
bank market integration a￿ect the availability and cost of bank loans? And does rapid integration
simply lead to cheaper ￿rm ￿nancing, or also to excessive leverage? Given the freezing and subse-
quent partial disintegration of interbank markets after August 2007, and in order to make informed
inferences about the e￿ect of interbank market disfunctionality on the real economy, it is important
to investigate how pre-crisis integration a￿ected the ￿nancing of small and medium enterprises. By
studying the mechanisms through which the integration of the interbank market works, our paper
contributes to a growing literature on the bene￿ts and costs of ￿nancial globalization.2
Theory suggests that interbank market integration increases the availability and reduces the
cost of bank loans granted to ￿rms through three di￿erent channels. Interbank market integration:
1) increases the competition to supply bank loans; 2) reduces the cost of external funding for
banks; and 3) allows for greater diversi￿cation of risk.3 As the interbank market provides banks
with ready access to short- and long-term loans to ￿nance their own investment operations and
cushion liquidity shocks, interbank market integration allows banks to o￿er more and/or cheaper
￿nancing. The secured interbank market further allows for diversi￿cation without the risk of cross-
regional ￿nancial contagion (Fecht, Gr￿ uner, and Hartmann (2007)). Interbank market integration
can therefore increase the bene￿ts of integrating the retail banking markets. The more favorable
conditions at which banks will borrow and share risks in principle should result in better loan terms
for all ￿rms, and more ￿nancing with bank loans.4
1The euro area has been a prime example of swift integration following the introduction of the common currency,
with various estimates of the resulting increase in GDP ranging between 0:3% and 2%. See "Quanti￿cation of the
Macro-Economic Impact of EU ￿nancial integration" by London Economics.
2The real e￿ects of ￿nancial integration that are investigated include its e￿ect on economic growth (Edison, Levine,
Ricci, and Slok (2002)), entrepreneurial activity (Giannetti and Ongena (2009)), and cross-country correlations in
GDP growth (Imbs (2004)), among others.
3Regarding the latter, interbank market integration may have an impact that is independent of cross-border bank
ownership. Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and S￿rensen (2007) for example ￿nd that the deregulation of the US banking
sector a￿ected the income insurance of small business owners without any signi￿cant multistate cross-ownership of
banks.
4Integration in interbank markets need not naturally arise, however. Freixas and Holthausen (2005) for example8
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-PXFWFS UIFSF BSF UXP QPUFOUJBM EPXOTJEFT UP UIJT QSPDFTT +JSTU JG JOUFHSBUJPO JT BDDPNQBOJFE
CZ GPSFJHO CBOL FOUSZ TNBMM SNT NBZ CF SBUJPOFE BT GPSFJHO CBOLT DPODFOUSBUF UIFJS MFOEJOH
PO MBSHF SNT UIBU BSF JOWPMWFE JO UIF QSPEVDUJPO PG USBEFBCMFT &HFOPS  8FDPOE XIJMF
JOUFHSBUJPO JT FYQFDUFE UP JNQSPWF OBODJOH DPOEJUJPOT BOE JODSFBTF MFWFSBHF GPS UIF SNT UIBU
IBWF BDDFTT UP CBOL DSFEJU ,JBOOFUUJ BOE 4OHFOB ! SBQJE JOUFHSBUJPO NJHIU BMTP SFTVMU JO
FYDFTTJWF MFWFSBHJOH BOEPS EFQFOEFODF PO CBOL MPBOT 8VDI B QSPDFTT DBO IBWF B TJ[FBCMF OFHBUJWF
FFDU PO SNT JG JU JT GPMMPXFE CZ B DSFEJU DSVODI PG UIF UZQF UIBU XBT FYQFSJFODFE HMPCBMMZ BGUFS
&VHVTU 

4OF GVOEBNFOUBM QPJOU TIPVME CF NBEF IPXFWFS 5SJPS SFTFBSDI IBT TVHHFTUFE UIBU UIF CFO
FUT PG CBOL JOUFHSBUJPO PO TNBMM CVTJOFTT OBODF BSF BFDUFE CZ UIF JOUFOTJUZ PG DSFEJU NBSLFU
DPNQFUJUJPO .U JT VODMFBS IPXFWFS JG DPNQFUJUJPO GPTUFST PS TMPXT JOUFHSBUJPO (PNQFUJUJPO MPXFST
UIF TVSQMVT CBOLT DBO FYUSBDU GSPN UIFJS CPSSPXFST BOE TQFFET VQ JOUFSFTU SBUF BEKVTUNFOUT 0MFJO
! .O DPODFOUSBUFE BOE VODPOUFTUFE NBSLFUT UIF GFX PQFSBUJOH CBOLT NBZ CF TMPX UP QBTT
UIF EFDMJOF JO NBSLFU JOUFSFTU SBUFT UP UIFJS DMJFOUT .G DPNQFUJUJPO JT FSDF CBOLT BSF GPSDFE UP
SFBDU RVJDLMZ OPU UP MPTF NBSLFU TIBSF .OUFHSBUJPO JO UIF JOUFSCBOL NBSLFUT NBZ UIFSFGPSF NBLF
CBOL MPBO UFSNT SFBDU NPSF RVJDLMZ BOE TVCTUBOUJBMMZ UP JUT DIBOHFT -PXFWFS DPNQFUJUJPO BOE
UIFSFGPSF JOUFHSBUJPO NBZ OPU CFOFU BMM SNT BU BMM UJNFT 5FUFSTFO BOE 7BKBO !! GPS FYBNQMF
BSHVF UIBU XIFO DSFEJU NBSLFUT BSF DPODFOUSBUFE CBOLT BSF NPSF MJLFMZ UP OBODF UIF PQBRVF JF
TNBMM PS ZPVOH SNT CFDBVTF JOUFSOBMJ[JOH UIF CFOFUT PG BTTJTUJOH UIFN JT QPTTJCMF .OUFSOBUJPOBM
OBODJBM MJCFSBMJ[BUJPO NBZ UIFSFGPSF MFBE UP B EFUFSJPSBUJPO PG DSFEJU DPOEJUJPOT GPS TNBMM SNT
4VS QBQFS DPOUSJCVUFT UP UIF MJUFSBUVSF CZ FTUJNBUJOH UIF FFDU PG JOUFSCBOL NBSLFU JOUFHSBUJPO
PO TNBMM SN OBODF XIJMF UBLJOH JOUP BDDPVOU UIF TUSVDUVSF PG DSFEJU NBSLFUT <F GPDVT PO B TBNQMF
PG  SNT GSPN  DPVOUSJFT  OFX *: NFNCFS TUBUFT BOE  FVSP [POF DPVOUSJFTC F U X F F O
/BOVBSZ !!  BOE )FDFNCFS  UBLFO GSPN UIF 'VTJOFTT *OWJSPONFOU BOE *OUFSQSJTF 5FSGPSNBODF
8VSWFZ '**58 '**58 DPOUBJOT JOEJWJEVBM MPBO DIBSBDUFSJTUJDT BU B NPOUIMZ GSFRVFODZ 9IF
SFTVMUJOH DPNQSFIFOTJWF !NPOUI TZOUIFUJD QBOFM DPOUBJOT DPOTJEFSBCMF WBSJBUJPO BDSPTT DPVOUSJFT
G<CK H<5H O K<9B 65B?G B998 HC 7CD9 K=H< @=EI=8=HM G<C7?G 6M 6CFFCK=B; CF 6M @=EI=85H=B; 5GG9HG O 5B 9EI=@=6F=IA
K=H< A5F?9H =BH9;F5H=CB 8C9G BCH 5@K5MG 9L=GH =B H<9=F AC89@ =BH9;F5H=CB A5M 9J9B 7C9L=GH K=H< G9;A9BH5H=CB
099 :CF 9L5AD@9 &J5G<=B5 5B8 07<5F:GH9=B  5B8 -IF= /C7<C@@ 5B8 0H99B  :CF ;@C65@ 9J=89B79 CB
H<9 F98I7H=CB C: 6IG=B9GG @9B8=B; 8IF=B; H<9  B5B7=5@ 7F=G=G9
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BOE PWFS UJNF
+PS UIF OFX *: NFNCFS TUBUFT UIF TBNQMF QFSJPE DPJODJEFT XJUI UIFJS SBQJE USBOTJUJPO GSPN
QBSPDIJBM DSFEJU NBSLFUT XJUI NPTUMZ TUBUFPXOFE OBODJBM JOTUJUVUJPOT UP JOUFHSBUFE DSFEJU NBS
LFUT QPQVMBUFE CZ GPSFJHOPXOFE OBODJBM JOTUJUVUJPOT XJUI SFBEZ BDDFTT UP JOUFHSBUFE FVSP[POF
JOUFSCBOL NBSLFUT .OUFSCBOL NBSLFU JOUFHSBUJPO JO UIF FVSP BSFB DPVOUSJFT XBT BMNPTU DPNQMFUF
BU UIF CFHJOOJOH PG UIF QFSJPE PVS EBUB QSPWJEFT VT XJUI B DPOUSPM BOE B USFBUNFOU HSPVQ UP FTUJ
NBUF UIF FFDU PG JOUFHSBUJPO PO TNBMM SN OBODF <F DPOTUSVDU NFBTVSFT PG CPUI UIF EFHSFF BOE
TQFFE BU XIJDI ZJFMET JO BMM OBUJPOBM JOUFSCBOL NBSLFUT DPOWFSHF SFMBUJWF UP ZJFMET JO ,FSNBOZ UIF
DPVOUSZ XF UBLF BT PVS CFODINBSL NBSLFU BOE SFMBUF DPOWFSHFODF UP CBOL MPBO SBUFT BOE UP SN
MFWFSBHJOH
<F BEESFTT POF JNQPSUBOU NFUIPEPMPHJDBM QPJOU 'VTJOFTT MPBOT BSF POMZ PCTFSWFE XIFO SNT
BQQMZ GPS DSFEJU BOE CBOLT HSBOU JU 2PTU TUVEJFT BOBMZ[JOH UIF FFDU PG NBSLFU DPOEJUJPOT PO
CBOL MPBO UFSNT JHOPSF UIJT TFRVFOUJBM TFMFDUJPO QSPDFTT .O DPOUSBTU XF BDDPVOU GPS UIF MPBO
BQQMJDBUJPO BOE HSBOUJOH EFDJTJPO CZ FTUJNBUJOH B EPVCMF TFMFDUJPO NPEFM 4VS EBUBTFU DPOUBJOT
EFUBJMFE JOGPSNBUJPO PO SNT UIBU EJE OPU BQQMZ GPS CBOL MPBOT BOE JOGPSNBUJ P OP O S N TU I B U
BQQMJFE CVU XFSF EFOJFE CBOL MPBOT -FDLNBO !! TIPXT UIBU TVDI PCTFSWFE JOGPSNBUJPO DBO
CF VTFE UP FMJNJOBUF UIF CJBT JOEVDFE CZ UIF MFGUUSVODBUJPO PG UIF TBNQMF -FODF XIJMF XF BSF
NPTUMZ JOUFSFTUFE JO UIF MPBO UFSNT GPS UIF HSPVQ PG SNT UIBU TFFL BOE PCUBJO CBOL MPBOT XF BSF
BCMF UP FMJNJOBUF UIF TQFDJDBUJPO FSSPS SFTVMUJOH GSPN UIF EPVCMF TBNQMF TFMFDUJPO CZ JODPSQPSBUJOH
JOGPSNBUJPO GSPN UIF PUIFS HSPVQT PG SNT JO PVS FTUJNBUJPO 9IVT XF BSF BCMFU PQ V S H FU I FC J B T
TUFNNJOH GSPN UIF FFDU PG JOUFHSBUJPO PO CBOL DSFEJU EFTJSBCJMJUZ BOE DSFEJU DPOTUSBJOUT
<F OE UIBU JOUFSCBOL NBSLFU JOUFHSBUJPO BMMFWJBUFT DSFEJU DPOTUSBJOUT BOE EFDSFBTFT UIF MPBO
SBUFT DIBSHFE UP SNT CPUI JO B TUBUJTUJDBMMZ TJHOJDBOU BOE FDPOPNJDBMMZ SFMFWBOU XBZ &GUFS BD
DPVOUJOH GPS SN TFMFDUJPO B EFFQFOJOH PG JOUFSCBOL NBSLFU JOUFHSBUJPO CZ UXP TUBOEBSE EFWJBUJPOT
XPVME SFTVMU JO B EFDSFBTF JO MPBO SBUFT CZ  CBTJT QPJOUT .G B FVSP [POF DPVOUSZ JO UIF TBNQMF
SFUVSOT UP JUT EFHSFF PG JOUFSCBOL NBSLFU JOUFHSBUJPO JO UIF MBTU ZFBS QSJPS UP KPJOJOH UIF FVSP
,B9 9L79DH=CB =G  <5?F5J5FHM 5B8 4=@A5N9F  !9;FMG9 (=A 5B8 ,B;9B5  F9J=9K GHI8=9G H<5H 9AD@CM
=B8=J=8I5@ @C5B 7CBHF57H 85H5 HC 5GG9GG H<9 =AD57H C: 65B?=B; A5F?9H 7CAD9H=H=CB CB 65B? @C5B F5H9G +CB9 C: H<9G9
GHI8=9G AC89@ H<9 @C5B 5DD@=75H=CB 5B8 ;F5BH=B; 897=G=CBG10
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loan rates will, ceteris paribus, be almost 60 basis points higher. However, these results are only
observed in countries with a considerable degree of credit market competition. Our estimates hold
regardless of whether we look at integration measures based on the convergence of nominal prices,
or at integration measures based on cross-border interbank lending. Finally, lower loan rates may
lead to excessive ￿rm leverage. If for example integration increases by two standard deviations, the
probability that a ￿rm is overleveraged vis-￿ a-vis the leverage of a similar benchmark ￿rm increases
between 10% and 13%. Our evidence thus points to one speci￿c channel through which the Eu-
ropean integration of the past decade contributed to both the growth and the vulnerability of the
region’s non-￿nancial ￿rms.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the construction of our measure
of interbank market integration. Section 3 summarizes the country-level (measures of interbank
market rates and credit market competition) and ￿rm-level data (individual bank loans and ￿rm
characteristics). Section 4 describes the empirical method and presents the empirical evidence.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Measuring interbank market integration
Financial integration in general and interbank market integration in particular can be de￿ned using
two broad criteria: the volume of transactions and the e￿ciency of the markets (Obstfeld (1986)).7
In this paper, we choose as a proxy for interbank market integration a measure ￿ a la Engle and
Granger (1987), namely, the measures of the co-integration between the rates in the domestic
interbank markets and the rates in Germany, which we take as our benchmark market. Given that
we want to compute the degree of integration in di￿erent subperiods over a longer time period, the
simplest possible model that can be estimated is:
r
j
t = ￿j + ￿jrb
t + "t (1)
7Measuring the volumes of transactions has an innate appeal. But a smaller number of international ￿nancial
transactions does not automatically imply market segmentation, if integration makes domestic and foreign investments
equivalent for investors. On the other hand, capital ￿ight in response to monetary and/or ￿nancial distress is hardly a
sign of deepening integration. Measures of ￿nancial integration based on the law of one price are therefore preferred.
We will nevertheless in the robustness section also develop quantity measures of integration.11
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panel-econometric approach, we can then test for the impact of the benchmark interbank market
rate on the country-level interbank market rate.
Formally, we estimate the model in Equation (2) as well as the model:
￿r
j







t + vjt (3)
￿r
j
t is the di￿erence in adjacent daily yields for country j and ￿rb
t is the di￿erence in adjacent
daily yields for the benchmark country Germany. Thus, Equation (2) re￿ects the long-run equi-
librium adjustment, while Equation (3) represents the short-term adjustment of local interbank
market rates to their long-run equilibrium. In all estimations, we include the market rates for
the di￿erent countries separately in order to observe country-speci￿c e￿ects. The short-run model
includes the error-correction term ￿jujt￿1. The ￿nal estimates of interest of the degree of interbank


















3.1 Interbank market integration indicators
To compute our main proxy for interbank market integration we employ interbank nominal yields
on 1-, 3- and 6-month money market instruments from the Global Financial database for the period
January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2005. We focus on the 6-month yields, but use 1- and 3-month
series in robustness tests.8 The sample features a control group of euro-zone countries for which
integration was achieved as early as the beginning of the period, and a treatment group of central
and eastern European countries which started at low level of integration and integrated at di￿erent
speed over the period.
Figures 1 to 3 show that integration has deepened between 1998 and 2005 in all countries in
the sample but that the process of integration across countries has been uneven. While in January
1998 the average integration measure ￿
j
t on interbank market rates on 6-month instruments for
8In 1998, the benchmark is the German interbank market, but that after 1 January 1999, the 6-month rate re￿ects
the level of the euro area interbank market rate for that maturity.13
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the 8 central and east European countries was 5:82 (corresponding to a average spread of 2;058
basis points), by December 2005 it declined to 2:21 (corresponding to an average spread of 188
basis points), and only 1:93 (corresponding to an average spread of 121 basis points) if the most
non-integrated country (Romania) is excluded from the sample. The developments in the yields on
1-month and 3-month instruments have been very similar. The ￿gures demonstrate the evolution
of our measure of interbank market integration over time: apart from Hungary and Poland, which
show signs of divergence since 2003 and 2004, respectively, the ￿
j
t’s for the rest of the countries in
our sample have indeed converged towards 1. In addition, Figure 4 shows that in terms of both
nominal yields and integration measures, Romania is an outlier - it only achieved in 2005 the level
of integration that the rest of the central and east European countries already had in 1998. The
reason for that is the very volatile ￿scal and monetary policy during the sample period, resulting
in high and variable in￿ation and consequently in very high initial values of nominal interest rates,
and consequently very slow convergence. This motivates the exclusion of Romania in most of the
empirical analysis.
3.2 Firm-level data
We match the data on interbank market integration, constructed using the underlying data on in-
terbank market rates from the Global Financial database, in monthly frequency, with the ￿rm-level
data from the 2004 and the 2005 version of BEEPS, the Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey that is collected jointly by the World Bank and the European Bank for Re-
construction and Development.
The two waves of BEEPS asked 9;655 ￿rms from 27 countries in Central and Eastern Europe
and 4;453 ￿rms in 5 euro zone countries about their experience with ￿nancial and legal constraints,
as well as government corruption. BEEPS also includes questions about ￿rm ownership structure,
sector of operation, industry structure, export activities, use of external auditing services and/or
International Accounting Standards (IAS), subsidies received from central and local governments,
etc. The ￿rms were interviewed over a 1:5-year period, between the end of 2004 and the middle of
2005. The survey response rate was 36:9%. Surveyees who refused to participate or were unavailable14
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1252
October 2010
GPS JOUFSWJFXT BDDPVOUFE GPS   PG UIF PSJHJOBM UBSHFU HSPVQ +JSNT UIBU XFSF JOFMJHJCMF EVF UP
UIF OFDFTTJUZ UP GVMMM JOEVTUSZ RVPUBT BDDPVOUFE GPS UIF SFNBJOEFS &T XF BSF JOUFSFTUFE JO UIF
FFDUT PG JOUFHSBUJPO XF TUVEZ UIF DPVOUSJFT UIBU XFSF *: NFNCFST BU UIF FOE PG UIF JOUFSWJFX
QFSJPE
9IF OBM EBUBTFU VTFE JODMVEFT  SNT GSPN  DPVOUSJFT UIBU CFDBNF *: NFNCFST BGUFS
)FDFNCFS  !! 'VMHBSJB UIF ([FDI 7FQVCMJD *TUPOJB -VOHBSZ 1BUWJB 1JUIVBOJB 5PMBOE
7PNBOJB 8MPWFOJB BOE 8MPWBLJB BOE  DPVOUSJFT UIBU XFSF *: NFNCFST GSPN UIF TUBSU ,SFFDF
.SFMBOE 5PSUVHBM BOE 8QBJO 7FTQPOEFOU SNT DPNF GSPN   EJFSFOU TFDUPST" 2JOJOH BOE RVBSSZ
JOH# (POTUSVDUJPO# 2BOVGBDUVSJOH# 9SBOTQPSUBUJPO TUPSBHF BOE DPNNVOJDBUJPO# <IPMFTBMF SFUBJM
BOE SFQBJST# 7FBM FTUBUF SFOUJOH BOE CVTJOFTT TFSWJDFT# -PUFMT BOE SFTUBVSBOUT# BOE 4UIFST 9IF
OVNCFS PG SNT DPWFSFE JT SPVHIMZ QSPQPSUJPOBM UP UIF OVNCFS PG SNT JO UIF DPVOUSZ SBOHJOH
GSPN  JO 1JUIVBOJB UP ! JO 5PMBOE 9IF TVSWFZ BMTP USJFE UP BDIJFWF SFQSFTFOUBUJWFOFTT JO
UFSNT PG UIF TJ[F PG SNT JU TVSWFZFE" CFUXFFO UXP UIJSET BOE UISFF RVBSUFST PG UIF SNT TVSWFZFE
BSF TNBMM MFTT UIBO  XPSLFST BOE BSPVOE  PG UIF SNT TVSWFZFE BSF MBSHF NPSF UIBO
 XPSLFST 9BCMF  QSPWJEFT UIF TVNNBSZ TUBUJTUJDT PO UIF OVNCFS PG SNT BOE UIFJS TJ[F
EJTUSJCVUJPO CZ DPVOUSZ
&MUIPVHI UIF EBUBTFU JT BMNPTU QVSFMZ DSPTTTFDUJPOBM GPS FBDI SN BOTXFST BSF BWFSBHFE PWFS
UIF QFSJPE PG UIF TVSWFZ UIFSF JT B UJNF EJNFOTJPO JO UIF EBUB PO CBOL MPBOT .OEFFE FBDI SN
JT BTLFE BCPVU UIF DPTU NBUVSJUZ DVSSFODZ EFOPNJOBUJPO BOE UIF UJNF JU UPPL UP OFHPUJBUF UIF
MBTU CBOL MPBO  JG BOZ  BT XFMM BT BCPVU UIF FYBDU NPOUI BOE ZFBS JO XIJDI UIF MPBO XBT SFDFJWFE
+JSNT SFQPSU UP IBWF SFDFJWFE MPBOT CFUXFFO /BOVBSZ !!  BOE )FDFNCFS 4 O U I F C B T J T P G
UIJT JOGPSNBUJPO XF DPOTUSVDU B TZOUIFUJD QBOFM DPWFSJOH ! NPOUIT <F UIFO NBUDI UIJT QBOFM UP
PVS NFBTVSFT PG OBODJBM JOUFHSBUJPO 9IFTF NFBTVSFT BSF DBMDVMBUFE BT JO *RVBUJPOT  BOE 
GSPN EBJMZ ZJFMET JO UIF ,MPCBM +JOBODJBM EBUBCBTF 9IF 

	T BSF UIFO BWFSBHFE GPS FBDI NPOUI UP
HJWF !NPOUI TFSJFT ! PG UIF OPO,FSNBO SNT JO UIF EBUBTFU PCUBJOFE B MPBO EVSJOH UIJT
QFSJPE
099 <HHDKKK96F87CA7CIBHFMG97HCF97CBCGIFJ9MG699DG<HA :CF :IFH<9F 89H5=@98 F9DCFHG CB H<9 F9DF9G9B
H5H=J9B9GG C: H<9 GIFJ9M
$9FA5BM =G 9L7@I898 :FCA H<9 F9;F9GG=CB 5B5@MG=G 5G H<9 69B7<A5F? 7CIBHFM15
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+JSNT XJUI PVUTUBOEJOH CBOL DSFEJU QSPWJEF NBOZ EFUBJMT PO UIFJS NPTU SFDFOU MPBO 2PTU
JNQPSUBOU GPS PVS QVSQPTFT '**58 JODMVEFT JOGPSNBUJPO PO UIF BOOVBMJ[FE DPTU PG UIF MPBO 9IF
TVSWFZ GVSUIFS DPWFST MPBO EVSBUJPO BOE DPMMBUFSBMJ[BUJPO BT B QSPQPSUJPO PG UIF MPBO BNPVOU
<F GPDVT PO UIF MPBO SBUF BOE DBMDVMBUF UIF SFBM SBUF BT UIF TQSFBE CFUXFFO UIF OPNJOBM SBUF
PG UIF MPBO BOE UIF OPNJOBM ZJFME PO B ,FSNBO NPOUI NPOFZ NBSLFU JOTUSVNFOU JO UIF TBNF
ZFBS"NPOUI 9BCMF  QSPWJEFT UIF TBNQMF TVNNBSZ TUBUJTUJDT CZ DPVOUSZ GPS UIF NPTU SFMFWBOU MPBO
DIBSBDUFSJTUJDT <F FYDMVEF BMM PCTFSWBUJPOT GPS XIJDI MPBOT XFSF SFDFJWFE FBSMJFS UIBO /BOVBSZ !! 
.O UIF SFNBJOJOH TBNQMF UIF SFBM BWFSBHF BOOVBMJ[FE SBUF PG MPBOT JT  CBTJT QPJOUT SBOHJOH GSPN
 CBTJT QPJOUT JO .SFMBOE UP  CBTJT QPJOUT JO 7PNBOJB 9IF PWFSXIFMNJOH NBKPSJUZ PG MPBOT JO
BMM DPVOUSJFT BSF DPMMBUFSBMJ[FE CVU UIFSF JT HSFBU EFBM PG WBSJBUJPO XJUI UIF TIBSF PG DPMMBUFSBMJ[FE
MPBOT SBOHJOH GSPN   JO ,SFFDF UP ! JO 7PNBOJB &WFSBHF MPBO EVSBUJPO SBOHFT GSPN 
NPOUIT JO 8QBJO UP ! NPOUIT JO .SFMBOE <JUIJO UIF TVCTBNQMF PG DFOUSBM BOE FBTU *VSPQFBO
DPVOUSJFT 1JUIVBOJB IBT UIF MPXFTU BWFSBHF TQSFBE BU  CBTJT QPJOUT BOE *TUPOJB IBT UIF MPOHFTU
BWFSBHF NBUVSJUZ BU  ZFBS &MTP JO UFSNT PG EFWFMPQNFOU PWFS UJNF NPTU DPVOUSJFT TBX B EFDSFBTF
JO UIF SFBM MPBO SBUF CFUXFFO UIF STU BOE UIF MBTU RVBSUFS GPS XIJDI EBUB JT BWBJMBCMF XJUI UIF
FYDFQUJPO PG 5PSUVHBM XIFSF UIF BWFSBHF MPBO SBUF JODSFBTFE GSPN  UP  CBTJT QPJOUT BOE PG
7PNBOJB XIFSF UIF SFBM MPBO SBUF TUBZFE BU BU BQQSPYJNBUFMZ  CBTJT QPJOUT
(SVDJBM GPS PVS TFMFDUJPO DPSSFDUJPO XF DBO EFSJWF UIF SNT OFFE GPS B CBOL MPBO BOE UIF
UJHIUOFTT PG JUT OBODJBM DPOTUSBJOU EJSFDUMZ GSPN UIF BOTXFST UP TFWFSBM '**58 RVFTUJPOT 6VFTUJPO
B BTLT .G ZPVS SN EPFT OPU DVSSFOUMZ IBWF B MPBO XIBU XBT UIF SFBTPO% XIJMF 6VFTUJPO C
BTLT .G ZPVS SN EJE OPU BQQMZ GPS B MPBO XIBU XFSF UIF NBJO SFBTPOT% <F DMBTTJGZ SNT BT IBWJOH
OP OFFE GPS CBOL DSFEJU UIPTF DIPPTJOH JO C UIF BOTXFS )PFT OPU OFFE B MPBO BOE SNT BT DSFEJU
DPOTUSBJOFE UIPTF NBSLJOH JO B UIF BOTXFS 'FDBVTF UIF BQQMJDBUJPO XBT UVSOFE EPXO PS JO C
UIF BOTXFST &QQMJDBUJPO QSPDFEVSFT GPS CBOLT BSF UPP CVSEFOTPNF (PMMBUFSBM SFRVJSFNFOUT GPS
CBOL MPBOT BSF UPP TUSJDU .OUFSFTU SBUFT BSF UPP IJHI .U JT OFDFTTBSZ UP NBLF JOGPSNBM QBZNFOUT
UP HFU CBOL MPBOT PS )JE OPU UIJOL JU XPVME CF BQQSPWFE 9IJT TUSBUFHZ PG HSPVQJOH SNT UIBU
XFSF UVSOFE EPXO BOE SNT UIBU XFSF EJTDPVSBHFE GSPN BQQMZJOH JT BMTP FNQMPZ F EJ O( P YB O E
/BQQFMMJ !! BOE JT TUBOEBSE JO TUVEJFT UIBU SFMZ PO EFUBJMFE RVFTUJPOOBJSFT16
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We further use country-level variables to account for the e￿ect of interbank market integration.
The propensity of banks to grant credit and the loan rate will depend on the o￿cial money market
rates. For this reason, we include the contemporaneous monthly nominal rate in all regressions.
Finally, our second bank-level variable of interest capturing banking competition is either the
C3 measure of banking sector concentration taken from the 2008 update of Beck, Demirg￿ u￿ c-Kunt
and Levine (2000) or the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of banking sector assets taken from
Giannetti and Ongena (2009). The C3 is calculated as the share of banking sector assets held by
the 3 largest banks in the country. The HHI is calculated as the sum of the squared shares of total
assets held by each individual bank in the country. Both measures are only available at a yearly
frequency. Table 3 summarizes interbank market integration, foreign ownership of bank assets,
and the two banking sector competition variables averaged over the period 1998 to 2005 for the 14
countries in the dataset. While foreign ownership of bank assets is very low in Slovenia (17%),11 it
is above 50% in the rest of the central and eastern European countries, with a maximum of 97%
in Estonia. Estonia also boasts the lowest level of banking sector competition (98% of banking
sector assets are held by the 3 largest banks and the HHI equals 0:55), while the most competitive
banking environment is found in Poland (C3 equals 42%) and Bulgaria (HHI equals 0:08). As
expected, the C3 and the HHI measure are highly positively correlated (￿ = 0:59). There is also
a high correlation between foreign ownership and concentration in the commercial banking sector
(￿ = 0:31) and between foreign ownership and HHI (￿ = 0:32).
4 Empirical method and results
We estimate a simple model of the e￿ect of interbank market integration on business loan rates. The
approach accounts for the fact that loan rates are only observed conditional on ￿rms not being credit
constrained, and ￿rm’s credit constraints are only observed conditional on ￿rms’ having positive
demand for credit. The Appendix explains this three-stage Tobit scheme employed throughout the
paper in detail.
11Entry of foreign capital into the Slovenian banking sector only started in earnest in 2001. During the sample
period none of the largest banks in Slovenia had more than 50% foreign ownership.17
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First, in a basic model, we do not account for credit market competition and estimate the
following equation:
Yijt = ￿0 + ￿
j




where Yijt is either the real loan rate, i.e., the spread over the nominal benchmark money market
rate, on a loan granted to ￿rm i in country j at time t, or the ￿rm’s capital structure (for example,
￿rm leverage). ￿
j
t is interbank market integration in country j at time t from equation (2), Xi is a
vector of ￿rm and loan characteristics, Dj is a matrix of country dummies, Dt is a matrix of time
dummies, and
￿(c)
￿(c) is the inverse Mill’s ratio from the ￿rm-level probit estimate of credit constraint,
which incorporates information on credit demand (See Appendix). The estimator of interest is ￿1,
and given that lower ￿i
t implies higher integration, we expect it to have a positive sign.
In the main model of interest, we also account for the degree of competition in the banking
sector. BCj is either the C3 or HHI, de￿ned earlier. Formally, the model becomes:
Yijt = ￿0 + ￿
j
t ￿ BCjt￿1 + ￿i




As in the previous model, the estimator of interest is ￿1. In the empirical exercise, we proxy
banking sector concentration with dummies which equal 1 (0) if the country during this time
period is in the bottom (top) half of the distribution for bank concentration, or HHI. Again, we
expect the sign of ￿1 to be positive for the composite term with the dummy for low banking sector
concentration.
4.1 Unit roots and co-integration
Table 4 reports the within-country and panel unit root tests for benchmark and country-speci￿c
interbank market rates for 6-month instruments (the results are identical when we perform the ex-
ercise using the 1- and 3-month instruments). Table 4 also reports the Engle-Granger co-integration
test as applied to the long-run models of the interbank rates. The unit root tests estimates and18
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statistics (Columns (1)-(4)) indicate non-stationarity of the series at the 5% level for all but 3
countries in the dataset. For the panel the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected at the 5%
level. We also apply the unit root test for the ￿rst-di￿erence of the rates to test for second-order
non-stationarity. The results overwhelmingly reject I(2) and hence support the conclusion that the
rate series are integrated of order 1. Given these ￿ndings, we proceed to test for co-integration
between interbank market rates and the corresponding benchmark rates.
Columns (5) and (6) report the estimates and statistics from the Engle-Granger co-integration
test as applied to the long-run models of the interbank rates. For 8 of the 14 countries, as well as
for the full panel series, the hypothesis of no co-integration can be rejected at the 1% con￿dence
level. Apparently, for some countries the adjustment of the domestic rates is slow and not even a
long-run relationship can be detected in the sample. However, the results for the majority of the
countries (the euro zone countries plus the three Baltic states) as well as for the full series imply
a strong long-run equilibrium relationship between domestic and benchmark rates. Hence we can
proceed to construct and use our ￿
j
t with a strong degree of con￿dence.
4.2 Selection estimation
Table 5 presents the results from the ￿rst stage probit regression for bank loan desirability. The
probability of needing bank credit is higher in more integrated markets. We concur that the
interbank integration could a￿ect loan desirability through the e￿ect on interest rates ￿rms expect
to pay if they get a loan.12 This result immediately justi￿es our selection procedure: integration not
only (potentially) a￿ects loan rates, but also the degree to which ￿rms need loans. Not accounting
for this selection will introduce a bias into the main estimates.
It needs to be pointed out that in all exercises from now on we control for nominal interbank
rates. The level of the domestic interbank rate is an outcome of concurrent changes in monetary
and economic conditions. By including the domestic interbank rate we try to isolate the e￿ect of
interbank market integration on the cost of funding from other conditions that may in￿uence the
12It could also be driven by expectations of future rates. In unreported regressions, we add one and two year leads
of the interbank interest rate. While the coe￿cients on these two new terms are also negative and signi￿cant, the
estimated coe￿cient on the contemporaneous interbank integration remains qualitatively una￿ected. We also note
that dropping the integration variable does not a￿ect the other estimated coe￿cients.19
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MFWFM PG EPNFTUJD JOUFSCBOL SBUFT <F OE UIBU UIF QSPCBCJMJUZ PG OFFEJOH CBOL DSFEJU JT BMTP
IJHIFS JO NBSLFUT XIFSF OPNJOBM JOUFSCBOL SBUFT BSF MPXFS
7FHBSEJOH UIF SNMFWFM DPWBSJBUFT UIF OFFE GPS CBOL DSFEJU EFDSFBTFT JO UIF TJ[F PG UIF SN
BOE JT MPXFS GPS HPWFSONFOUPXOFE BOE GPSFJHOPXOFE SNT 9IF MBUUFS DPNQBOJFT NBZ GBDF MPXFS
DPTUT PG JOUFSOBM GVOEJOH FJUIFS EVF UP B TPGU CVEHFU DPOTUSBJOU JO UIF DBTF PG HPWFSONFOU PXOFSTIJQ
PS UP MBSHFS JOUFSOBM DBQJUBM NBSLFUT JO UIF DBTF PG GPSFJHO SNT 9IF OFFE GPS CBOL MPBOT JT
IJHIFS GPS FYQPSUFST QPUFOUJBMMZ EVF UP UIFJS GBTUFS FYQBOTJPO .U JT BMTP IJHIFS GPS TVCTJEJ[FE SNT
QPUFOUJBMMZ JNQMZJOH UIBU TVCTJEJFT TJHOBM OBODJBM OFFE NPSF UIBO UIFZ BMMFWJBUF JU BOE GPS SNT
XIJDI GBDF IJHI DPNQFUJUJPO QPUFOUJBMMZ JNQMZJOH MPXFS NBSHJOT BOE GFXFS JOUFSOBM GVOET UP OBODF
JOWFTUNFOU <IFUIFS UIF PXOFSTIJQ PG UIF SN DIBOHFE IBOET GSPN UIF TUBUF UP UIF QSJWBUF TFDUPS
EPFTOU NBUUFS GPS CBOL MPBO OFFE
9BCMF  QSFTFOUT UIF SFTVMUT PG UIF QSPCJU FRVBUJPO GPS UIF BCTFODF PG CPSSPXJOH DPOTUSBJOUT
'FDBVTF DSFEJU DPOTUSBJOUT BSF POMZ PCTFSWFE DPOEJUJPOBM PO QPTJUJWF EFNBOE GPS DSFEJU XF JODMVEF
UIF JOWFSTF 2JMMT SBUJP FTUJNBUFE GSPN UIF MPBO EFTJSBCJMJUZ FRVBUJPO FTUJNBUFE JO 9BCMF  9IF
FYDMVTJPO SFTUSJDUJPO JT TBUJTFE CZ FYDMVEJOH UIF WBSJBCMF (PNQFUJUJPO GSPN UIF TFU PG JOEFQFOEFOU
WBSJBCMFT" SNT JO NPSF DPNQFUJUJWF FOWJSPONFOUT XJMM MJLFMZ EFNBOE NPSF DSFEJU EVF UP MPXFS QSPU
NBSHJOT CVU JU JT VOMJLFMZ UIBU DSFEJU EFDJTJPOT XJMM CF DPSSFMBUFE XJUI QSPEVDU NBSLFU DPNQFUJUJPO
NBLJOH UIJT WBSJBCMF B HPPE JEFOUJFS PG EFNBOE <F BHBJO OE UIBU JOUFHSBUJPO NBUUFST  UIJT UJNF
JO NPSF JOUFHSBUFE NBSLFUT SNT BSF NPSF MJLFMZ UP CF DPOTUSBJOFE 3PU TVSQSJTJOHMZ UIF QSPCBCJMJUZ
PG CFJOH VODPOTUSBJOFE JT MPXFS GPS TNBMM BOE NFEJVNTJ[F SNT BT XFMM BT GPS DPNQBOJFT XIJDI BSF
JOEJWJEVBMMZPXOFE UIFTF SNT NBZ CF DPOTJEFSFE NPSF PQBRVF *YQPSUFST BOE FTQFDJBMMZ GPSFJHO
PXOFE SNT IBWF FBTJFS BDDFTT UP CBOL DSFEJU XIJMF SFDJQJFOUT PG TVCTJEJFT BSF NPSF DPOTUSBJOFE
+JSNT UIBU VTF FYUFSOBM BVEJUPST IBWF B IJHIFS QSPCBCJMJUZ PG CFJOH VODPOTUSBJOFE <IJMF XF EP OPU
DMBJN BOZ DBVTBMJUZ \ VODPOTUSBJOFE SNT NBZ IBWF B IJHIFS QSPCBCJMJUZ PG FNQMPZJOH DPTUMZ FYUFSOBM
BVEJUJOH TFSWJDFT \ BVEJUJOH NBZ SFEVDF UIF JOGPSNBUJPOBM PQBDJUZ PG UIF SN BOE UIVT NBZ IBWF
B QPTJUJWF FFDU PO UIF BWBJMBCJMJUZ PG DSFEJU 'SPXO /BQQFMMJ BOE 5BHBOP ! .NQPSUBOUMZ
XF OE UIBU TFMFDUJPO NBUUFST" UIF DPFDJFOU PO UIF JOWFSTF 2JMMT SBUJP JT QPTJUJWF JNQMZJOH UIBU
39 BCH9 H<5H K<9B 8FCDD=B; 9=H<9F CB9 J5F=56@9 :FCA H<9 GD97=75H=CB H<9 7C97=9BH CB H<9 CH<9F J5F=56@9 5B8
5@@ CH<9F 9GH=A5H98 7C97=9BHG =G ACGH@M IB597H9820
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unobserved factors that increase the demand for a business loan tend to decrease the probability
that the ￿rm will be constrained.
4.3 Main results
In Table 7, we report the estimates for Equation (4) that assesses the e￿ect of interbank market
integration on real loan rates (the spread between the nominal rate of the loan and the nominal yield
on a German 6-month money market instrument in the same year:month). We use the estimate of
the degree of convergence of 6-month nominal yields as a proxy for interbank market integration,
and do not yet account for the structure of the banking sector. We start by dropping all Romanian
￿rms. As mentioned before, due to very volatile ￿scal and monetary policy during the period,
resulting in high and variable in￿ation, the integration series for Romania is an outlier relative
to the rest of the sample, with very high initial values of nominal interest rates and very slow
convergence.
We ￿rst estimate Equation (4) without and then with ￿rm-level co-variates (Columns (1) and
(2), respectively). We ￿nd that small ￿rms face higher loan rates, as expected, while audited
￿rms and exporters pay lower rates. Longer maturity loans carry lower loan rates. Importantly
for us, the estimate of ￿1 is positive and signi￿cant at the 1% level: ￿rms operating in countries
where interbank markets are more integrated obtain lower loan rates. Numerically, a two standard
deviation increase in interbank market integration would lead to a decrease in real rates by about
123 basis points. The result even holds when we limit the sample to the euro zone countries only.
The estimated coe￿cients then imply that if all euro zone countries were to go back to the degree
of interbank market integration in their last year prior to joining the euro zone,14 loan rates would
be ceteris paribus higher by 50 basis points on average.
Next, in Column (3) we account for the left-truncation of the sample by including the selection
term estimated in the probit equation of the probability of a ￿rm being unconstrained. The
exclusion restriction is satis￿ed by excluding the variable "Subsidized" from the set of independent
variables: ￿rms with access to government subsidies will likely be rationed less often as they will
14Ireland, Portugal and Spain joined the euro zone on January 1, 1999, and Greece on January 1, 2001.21
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CF QFSDFJWFE UP IBWF BDDFTT UP B SFQBZNFOU UFDIOPMPHZ CVU JU JT VOMJLFMZ UIBU TVCTJEJFT XJMM IBWF
BO FFDU PO UIF MPBO SBUFT UIFNTFMWFT NBLJOH UIFN B HPPE JOTUSVNFOU GPS DSFEJU TVQQMZ &GUFS
BDDPVOUJOH GPS TFMFDUJPO XF FTUJNBUF UIBU B UXP TUBOEBSE EFWJBUJPO JODSFBTF JO JOUFSCBOL NBSLFU
JOUFHSBUJPO XPVME MFBE UP B EFDSFBTF JO SFBM SBUFT CZ BCPVU  CBTJT QPJOUT *YDMVEJOH UIF TFMFDUJPO
UFSNT GSPN UIF FRVBUJPO UIVT SFTVMUT JO BO VOEFSFTUJNBUJPO PG UIF USVF FFDUC ZB S P V O E  
.O (PMVNO  XF FYDMVEF BMM MPBOT HSBOUFE JO GPSFJHO DVSSFODZ 1FOEJOH JO GPSFJHO DVSSFODZ JT
BO JNQPSUBOU QIFOPNFOPO JO NBOZ PG UIF DPVOUSJFT JO UIF TBNQMF +PS FYBNQMF BOE TJNJMBSMZ PO
UIF CBTJT PG UIF '**58 EBUBTFU 'SPXO 4OHFOB BOE >FTJO   EPDVNFOU UIBU ! PG UIF MPBOT
SFQPSUFE JO 7PNBOJB BSF JO GPSFJHO DVSSFODZ BOE UIBU NPSF UIBO  PG UIF MPBOT JO 'VMHBSJB
*TUPOJB -VOHBSZ 1BUWJB 1JUIVBOJB BOE 8MPWFOJB BSF <F FYQFDU GPSFJHO DVSSFODZ MFOEJOH UP CF
MFTT JOVFODFE CZ EPNFTUJD JOUFSCBOL NBSLFU JOUFHSBUJPO .OEFFE MFOEJOH JO GPSFJHO DVSSFODZ NBLFT
JU NPSF MJLFMZ UIBU GVOET BSF PCUBJOFE CZ UIF CBOL BT B OBUVSBM IFEHF JO GPSFJHO DVSSFODZ JO GPSFJHO
OBODJBM NBSLFUT QPUFOUJBMMZ NBLJOH EPNFTUJD NBSLFU EFWFMPQNFOUT MFTT SFMFWBOU 9IF FDPOPNJD
BOE TUBUJTUJDBM TJHOJDBODF PG PVS FTUJNBUFT SFNBJOT MJUUMF DIBOHFE XIFO XF POMZ GPDVT PO MPBOT
EFOPNJOBUFE JO EPNFTUJD DVSSFODZ
9IF FFDU PG JOUFHSBUJPO PO MPBO SBUFT BMTP SFNBJOT VODIBOHFE XIFO XF FYDMVEF BMM MPBOT HSBOUFE
CFGPSF /BOVBSZ   (PMVNO  9IF SBUJPOBMF GPS UIF MBUUFS UFTU JT UIBU SNT XJUI MPBOT
HSBOUFE B MPOH QFSJPE JO UIF QBTU NJHIU OPU QSPWJEF SFMJBCMF JOGPSNBUJPO <F BMTP XBOU UP UFTU
JG UIF SFTVMUT IPME EVSJOH UIF SFMBUJWFMZ NPSF JOUFHSBUFE QFSJPE BT XFMM +JOBMMZ UIF NBHOJUVEF PG
UIF FTUJNBUFT JODSFBTFT TVCTUBOUJBMMZ XIFO XF SFQMBDF UIF DPVOUSZ BOE ZFBS EVNNJFT XJUI DPVOUSZ
TQFDJD UJNF USFOET JO (PMVNO  JNQMZJOH UIBU UP TPNF EFHSFF PVS NFBTVSF PG JOUFHSBUJPO NJHIU
CF QSPYZJOH GPS B DPNNPO SFHJPOBM USFOE
<F BMTP OE UIBU UIF FDPOPNJD FFDU PG UIF JOUFHSBUJPO NFBTVSF JT SFMBUJWFMZ MBSHFS UIBO UIF
FDPOPNJD FFDU PG OPNJOBM ZJFMET <F IZQPUIFTJ[F UIBU BDDFTT UP JOUFSOBUJPOBM NBSLFUT NBZ NBUUFS
SFMBUJWFMZ NPSF UIBO EPNFTUJD JOUFSCBOL NBSLFU SBUF MFWFMT UIBU BSF BO PVUDPNF PG UIF JOUFSQMBZ
CFUXFFO EFNBOE BOE TVQQMZ PG UIF EFHSFF PG DPNQFUJUJPO JO UIF CBOLJOH TFDUPS FUD 3FWFSUIFMFTT
XF BMTP OPUF UIBU JOUFHSBUJPO BOE UIF MFWFM PG OPNJOBM JOUFSCBOL ZJFMET UFOE UP NBUUFS KPJOUMZ GPS
SFBM MPBO SBUFT (PMVNOT  BOE 22
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In the analysis that follows, we exclude all loans denominated in foreign currency, as well as all
loans awarded before January 1, 2001, to make sure that our results are not contaminated by loans
that respond little to integration and by the period of most rapid integration.
4.4 Alternative measures of integration
Now we address the concern that a co-integration measure between the nominal yields on 6-month
domestic money market instruments relative and the nominal yields on 6-month German money
market instruments is a poor proxy for interbank market integration. In Table 8, we ￿rst test
whether our results still hold when we replace the co-integration measure of 6-month instruments
with a co-integration measure of instruments with lower maturities, namely 3-month and 1-months
ones (Columns (1) and (2)). Our results remain unchanged.
More importantly, as constructed, our measures of interbank market integration might be driven
by developments other than integration in interbank markets, like convergence of monetary policy
and real economic performance. Admittedly, from the point of view of an individual bank the rea-
sons behind convergence of interbank yields are irrelevant, as long as interbank funds are available
at lower and more predictable rates. Nevertheless, our co-movement based measure of interbank
market integration could be capturing more than simply integration in interbank markets.
In order to address this point, we look at measures of the intensity of cross-border interbank
activity between banks situated in each country (domestic or foreign) and banks situated in the
euro area. The BSI database of the European Central Bank contains information on total loans
and deposits by host country credit institutions with respect to euro area credit institutions. We
consider these data inferior (and do not use it as our main indicator of interbank market integration)
for several reasons. First, the data do not contain a break-down of volumes by maturity. Second, for
many of the countries the data are only available starting much later than our measure based on the
co-integration of yields. For example, for the 4 euro area countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain) the data start as early as 1998, but for a number of countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania,
Poland and Slovenia) the data only start in 2004, for others (Hungary) they are only available for
2005, and yet for another (Slovakia) the data are missing altogether for our sample period (they23
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start in 2006). This leaves us with 1/4 less observations than in the main empirical exercises (1;124
instead of 1;503). Nevertheless, we undertake this exercise to assuage concerns that - as already
mentioned - convergence of monetary policy and real economic performance, and not just interbank
market integration, may have been the main driver of a stronger co-movement of nominal interbank
rates across countries.
We take the data on the volume of interbank market deposits, interbank market loans, and
interbank market deposits plus loans, and normalize these three measures by GDP. The average
values over the sample period across all countries are 0.081, 0.064, and 0.139, respectively. The series
also show large dispersion across countries; for example, the deposits plus loans series, normalized
by GDP, ranges from a minimum of 0.017 in Lithuania in Q2:2004 to a maximum of 0.962 in Ireland
in Q4:2005. Then we replace our measure of interbank market integration in Equation (4) with
these three new measures of cross-country interbank market lending, one at a time. We con￿rm that
a higher volume of interbank deposits (Column (3)), interbank loans (Column (4)), and interbank
loans plus deposits (Column (5)) is associated with lower real rates on business loans, accounting
for the same ￿rm-level co-variates as before. While the estimates are only signi￿cant at the 10%
level, we can still conclude that our previous results are not contaminated by developments other
than the pure integration of domestic interbank markets into European interbank markets.
4.5 Identi￿cation, foreign ownership, errors-in-variables, and misreporting
We now address four main issues with the data and our methodology. First, there is a potential
endogeneity issue with our estimation strategy so far. Namely, if loan rates drop because of the
opening of the domestic banking market, banks may seek cheaper ￿nancing on the interbank market
spurring the integration of rates. In essence, this implies that our integration and loan rate measures
could be determined simultaneously, resulting in a bias in the estimation. To address this problem
which confounds identi￿cation, we proceed to implement the idea initially put forth by Rajan and
Zingales (1998) that ￿nance plays a more important role for ￿rms in industries that for technological
reasons are more dependent on external ￿nancing. Some of the key characteristics that make a ￿rm
or an industry more or less dependent on external ￿nancing are variations in the scale of projects,24
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HFTUBUJPO QFSJPE UIF SBUJP PG IBSE WT TPGU JOGPSNBUJPO UIBU JT CFJOH VTFE CZ MPBO PDFST UP BTTFTT
UIF CVTJOFTT UIF SBUJP PG UBOHJCMF WT JOUBOHJCMF BTTFUT GPMMPXVQ JOWFTUNFOUT FUD (POTFRVFOUMZ B
NBOVGBDUVSJOH SN XJMM SFTQPOE NPSF UP DIBOHFT JO FYUFSOBM OBODJOH UIBO B IPUFM PS B SFTUBVSBOU
BOE TP XPVME B TNBMM SN BOE BO JOGPSNBUJPOBMMZ PQBRVF SN 9IF CBTJD JEFB UIFO JT UP SBOL
SNT BOE JOEVTUSJFT CZ UIFJS OBUVSBM EFQFOEFODF PO CBOL OBODJOH UIFJS TJ[F BOE JOGPSNBUJPO
PQBDJUZ BOE VTF UIF JOEVTUSJFT XIJDI IBWF MPX TFOTJUJWJUZ UP CBOL OBODJOH BT XFMM BT UIF SNT
XJUI MBSHF QSPKFDUT BOE XJUI IJHI SBUJP PG IBSE JOGPSNBUJPO BT B DPOUSPM HSPVQ JO B TUBOEBSE
EJFSFODFJOEJFSFODFT FNQJSJDBM NPEFM .EFOUJDBUJPO JT BDIJFWFE CZ NFBTVSJOH UIF EJFSFOUJBM
FFDU PG JOUFSCBOL NBSLFU JOUFHSBUJPO CFUXFFO USFBUNFOU BOE DPOUSPM JOEVTUSJFTSNT
<F DBMDVMBUF B CFODINBSL JOEVTUSZTQFDJD QSPYZ GPS EFQFOEFODF PO FYUFSOBM OBODF CBTFE
PO JOGPSNBUJPO PO ,FSNBO SNT XIJDI BSF BMTP QSFTFOU JO UIF '**58 CVU BSF FYDMVEFE GSPN
UIF TBNQMF CFDBVTF XF VTF UIF ,FSNBO JOUFSCBOL SBUF BT PVS CFODINBSL <F DPOTUSVDU B DBQJUBM
VTBHF CFODINBSL VUJMJ[JOH JOGPSNBUJPO PO UIF SBUJP PG NBUFSJBM JOQVU DPTUT UP UPUBM TBMFT CZ ,FSNBO
SNT
 9IFO XF JOUFSBDU UIJT CFODINBSL WBMVF XJUI PVS NFBTVSF PG JOUFHSBUJPO JO *RVBUJPO 
<F BMTP JOUFSBDU XJUI UIF JOUFHSBUJPO WBSJBCMF B EVNNZ WBSJBCMF FRVBM UP  JG UIF SN JT TNBMM QSPYZ
GPS QSPKFDU TDBMF BOE B EVNNZ WBSJBCMF FRVBM UP  JG UIF SN JT BVEJUFE QSPYZ GPS USBOTQBSFODZ
9IF SFTVMUT SFQPSUFE JO (PMVNOT  PG 9BCMF ! DPOSN UIF WBMJEJUZ PG UIF QSPDFEVSF" OBNFMZ
XF OE UIBU POMZ JO JOEVTUSJFT UIBU BSF EFQFOEFOU PO FYUFSOBM OBODF BT XFMM BT GPS TNBMM BOE
JOGPSNBUJPOBMMZ PQBRVF SNT EPFT JOUFSCBOL NBSLFU JOUFHSBUJPO BFDU MPBO SBUFT JO UIF EJSFDUJPO
SFDPSEFE CFGPSF 9IFTF SFTVMUT HJWF VT DPOEFODF UIBU UIF FFDUT XF PCTFSWF BSF OPU EVF UP PNJUUFE
WBSJBCMF CJBT
8FDPOE XF BDDPVOU GPS UIF GBDU UIBU PVS NFBTVSF PG JOUFSCBOL NBSLFU JOUFHSBUJPO NBZ CF DPO
UBNJOBUFE CZ CBOLJOH TFDUPS JOUFHSBUJPO JO UIF TFOTF PG JODSFBTJOH GPSFJHO PXOFSTIJQ +PS JOTUBODF
JOUFSCBOL NBSLFU ZJFMET NBZ CF EFDSFBTJOH BMPOHTJEF CBOLT CFJOH BCMF UP CPSSPX JO JOUFSOBM DBQJUBM
BDDFTT GSPN UIFJS QBSFOU CBOLT 9IVT PVS NFBTVSF NBZ CF DBQUVSJOH UIF FFDU PG UIF BDRVJTJUJPO
PG DFOUSBM BOE FBTUFSO *VSPQFBO CBOLT CZ FVSP [POFCBTFE CBOLT SBUIFS UIBO JODSFBTFE JOUFSCBOL
1<9 F9GD97H=J9 A95B =B8IGHFM F5H=CG C: HCH5@ A5H9F=5@ 7CGHG HC HCH5@ G5@9G 5F9 5G :C@@CKG  *=B=B; 5B8
EI5FFM=B;   CBGHFI7H=CB  *5BI:57HIF=B;  1F5BGDCFH5H=CB GHCF5;9 5B8 7CAAIB=75H=CB 
3<C@9G5@9 F9H5=@ F9D5=FG  /95@ 9GH5H9 F9BH=B; 5B8 6IG=B9GG G9FJ=79G  %CH9@G 5B8 F9GH5IF5BHG 5B8 
,H<9F 39 7CBGHFI7H H<9 @9J9@ 69B7<A5F? 6M 5GG=;B=B; H<9 F9GD97H=J9 =B8IGHFM J5@I9 HC 5@@ FAG =B H<5H =B8IGHFM25
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BDUJWJUZ CFUXFFO UIF UXP UZQFT PG CBOLT SFTVMUJOH JO PNJUUFE WBSJBCMFT CJBT .O QSJODJQMF UIJT
DPODFSOT TIPVME CF BMMFWJBUFE CZ UIF GBDU UIBU PVS TBNQMF JT EPNJOBUFE CZ 82*T (POWFOUJPOBM
XJTEPN BSHVFT UIBU GPSFJHO CBOLT EP MFTT PGUFO CVTJOFTT XJUI 82*T BT UIFZ BSF SFMBUJWFMZ MFTT DBQB
CMF PG QSPDFTTJOH BOE RVBOUJGZJOH TPGU JOGPSNBUJPO 'FSHFS 0MBQQFS BOE :EFMM  -PXFWFS
SFDFOU SFTFBSDI IBT TIPXO UIBU GPSFJHO CBOLT BSF WFSZ NVDI JOWPMWFE XJUI 82*T EF MB 9PSSF
2BSU
 OF[ 5FS
 B BOE 8DINVLMFS  JODMVEJOH UIF SFHJPO PG DFOUSBM BOE FBTSFUSO *VSPQF )F
-BBT +FSFJSB BOE 9BDJ  IFODF XF OFFE UP GPSNBMMZ BEESFTT UIJT DPODFSO
9P UIBU FOE JO (PMVNO  XF JODMVEF BMPOHTJEF PVS NFBTVSF PG NPOFZ NBSLFUT JOUFHSBUJPO B
NFBTVSF PG UIF TIBSF PG CBOLJOH TFDUPS BTTFUT IFME CZ CBOLT XJUI BU MFBTU  GPSFJHO PXOFSTIJQ
<F BTTVNF UIBU GPSFJHO CBOL QSFTFODF JT B HPPE QSPYZ GPS DSPTTDPVOUSZ CBOLJOH TFDUPS JOUFHSBUJPO
BOE FTQFDJBMMZ BT JU HJWFT UIF JOEJWJEVBM CBOL BDDFTT UP B MBSHFS JOUFSOBM NBSLFU 9IF HJTU PG PVS
QSFWJPVT OEJOH SFNBJOT VODIBOHFE" BMM FMTF FRVBM SNT BSF DIBSHFE MPXFS MPBO SBUFT JO DPVOUSJFT
XJUI B IJHIFS TIBSF PG UIF CBOLJOH TFDUPS JO GPSFJHO IBOET
9IJSE XF BDDPVOU GPS FSSPSTJOWBSJBCMFT CJBT JOEVDFE CZ UIF GBDU UIBU PVS NFBTVSF PG JOUFSCBOL
NBSLFU JOUFHSBUJPO DPNFT GSPN B STUTUBHF SFHSFTTJPO BOE JT UIVT NFBTVSFEX J U I J OBD P O  E F O D F
JOUFSWBM *SSPSTJOWBSJBCMFT UFOE UP MFBE UP BO BUUFOVBUJPO CJBT XIFO UIF FSSPS JT MJOFBSMZ SFMBUFE
UP UIF USVF PCTFSWBUJPO JNQMZJOH UIBU BU XPSTU XF BSF NFBTVSJOH B MPXFS CPVOE GPS UIF FFDU JO UIF
418 TQFDJDBUJPO 3FWFSUIFMFTT XF TUJMM XBOU UP NBLF TVSF UIBU UIF TJHOJDBODF PG UIF SFTVMUT JT
OPU BFDUFE CZ UIF CJBT JO UIF TUBOEBSE FSSPST PG UIF FTUJNBUJPO +PS UIBU SFBTPO JO (PMVNO  XF
VTF BO .; QSPDFEVSF XIFSF PVS NFBTVSFT PG JOUFSCBOL NBSLFU JOUFHSBUJPO IBWF CFFO JOTUSVNFOUFE
GPS XJUI NFBTVSFT PG OPNJOBM EPNFTUJD JOUFSCBOL NBSLFU ZJFMET PCTFSWFE XJUI B NPOUI MBH 9IF
NBHOJUVEF PG PVS FTUJNBUFT JODSFBTFT TVCTUBOUJBMMZ DPOSNJOH UIBU UIF 418 QSPDFEVSF NBZ ZJFME
EPXOXBSE CJBTFE SFTVMUT .NQPSUBOUMZ PVS FTUJNBUFT TUBZ TJHOJDBOU BU UIF  MFWFM
+JOBMMZ XF BDDPVOU GPS UIF QPTTJCJMJUZ UIBU UIF SBUFT PO CVTJOFTT MPBOT BSF SFQPSUFE XJUI BO
FSSPS .U JT FOUJSFMZ DPODFJWBCMF UIBU XIFO SFTQPOEJOH UP UIF RVFTUJPO PO UIF MPBOT BOOVBM DPTU
UIF DPNQBOZ PXOFST NJTSFQPSU UIF USVF DPTU EVF UP GBVMUZ SFDPSET SPVOEJOH PS FWFO CBE NFNPSZ
9IF TBNQMF FYIJCJUT RVJUF B MBSHF WBSJBUJPO JO UIF STU EJHJU BGUFS UIF EFDJNBM QPJOU QPJOUJOH UP B
,IF 75@7I@5H=CBG 5F9 65G98 CB 85H5 :FCA 5B?G7CD9 5B8 J5F=CIG  9BHF5@ 65B?G26
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relative precision in the answers. Still, we prefer to account explicitly for measurement error. Our
solution is to replace our measure of the real rate on business loans with a dummy equal to 1 if the
real rate is bigger than 500 basis points, and to 0 otherwise. As indicated by the results reported
in Column (6), this doesn’t change the main results, and neither do di￿erent choices of the cut-o￿
for the dummy (unreported).
4.6 The e￿ect of banking competition
We now proceed to investigate the hypothesis that real business loan rates in more competitive
banking markets show a stronger response to the long-run integration of interbank markets com-
pared to less competitive markets. Table 10 presents the estimates from Equation (5). We ￿nd
that the e￿ect of interbank market integration is indeed transmitted di￿erently via the channel of
banking competition. In more competitive credit markets, ￿rms face signi￿cantly lower costs of
bank credit as interbank money market integration deepens (Column (1)). The estimates decrease
marginally when we account for selection (Column (2)). In this case, a doubling of our measure
of interbank market integration in countries in the lower half of the banking sector concentration
distribution leads to a decrease in real average annualized loan cost of 159 basis points. However,
we ￿nd no e￿ect of banking sector competition when instead of the low concentration dummy we
interact our measure of integration with a low HHI dummy (Column (3)).
In all equations, we interact both our measures of interbank market integration and the level
of domestic nominal yields on the instruments in question with the dummy for banking sector
concentration. While signi￿cant on its own, the interaction term which includes the level of nominal
money market rates becomes insigni￿cant once the interaction of concentration with our measure of
integration is included. This implies that the bulk of the e￿ect on real rates is carried by the degree
of convergence between domestic and international markets rather than by the nominal yields on
assets traded in domestic interbank markets.
We then proceed to check whether our results on the e￿ects of interbank money markets inte-
gration, accounting for banking sector concentration, are a￿ected by the choice of proxy for money
markets integration. In Columns (4) and (5), we repeat the estimations by replacing the estimate27
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of the degree of integration based on yields on 6-month interbank market instruments with es-
timates based on 3- and 1-month yields, respectively. The economic e￿ect increases marginally
for the shorter maturities. A doubling of the 1-month measure of interbank market integration
for example in countries in the lower half of the banking sector concentration distribution leads
to a decrease in real average annualized loan cost of "only" 132 basis points. Our results thus
con￿rm previous ￿ndings that bank interest rates respond less strongly to lower market rates in
concentrated banking sectors (Brown, Rueda, Pak, and Tynaev (2010)).
4.7 Firm ￿nance and leveraging
Finally, we turn our attention to the e￿ect of interbank market integration on the ￿nancing patterns
and the capital structure of the ￿rm. Our ￿nding that interbank market integration has reduced
the cost of credit leads us to expect that as a result of integration ￿rms will ￿nance a higher share
of their investment from local commercial banks. Naturally, that should come at the expense of
substitutes for bank ￿nancing. Firms are often forced to resort to trade credit or retained earnings
when rationed in the credit market (see Cu~ nat (2007) for example). Empirical studies have found
high sensitivity of investment to retained earnings and trade credit (see Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1988) for example). Hence, the evidence so far implies that we should see investment
being ￿nanced in larger part from banks and in lesser part from retained earnings and trade credit.
However, we also want to study whether integration hasn’t gone "too quickly too far", in the sense
of leading to excessive leverage for ￿rms in very integrated markets.
Table 11 presents evidence to that e￿ect. We ￿nd that ￿rms which received their last business
loan in an environment characterized by deeper interbank market integration ￿nanced a larger
share of their investment in the past 12 months via borrowing from domestic commercial banks
(Column (1)), but a lower share from retained earnings (Column (2)). While these two results
are only statistically signi￿cant at the 10%, both are a logical extension to our previous ￿ndings.
However, we ￿nd no signi￿cant e￿ect on the share of investment ￿nanced via trade credit (Column
(3)). This result remains unchanged when we look instead at working capital instead (unreported).
What these ￿ndings imply is that integration has enabled ￿rms to switch away from (potentially)28
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NPSF FYQFOTJWF UP DIFBQFS GPSNT PG OBODJOH -PXFWFS XF OPX XJTI UP LOPX XIFUIFS JOUFHSBUJPO
IBTOU HPOF UPP GBS UFNQUJOH SNT XJUI SBQJEMZ GBMMJOH SBUFT PO MPBOT UP UBLF PO FYDFTTJWF CBOL
EFCU <IJMF UIFSF JT OP DMFBSDVU EFOJUJPO PG FYDFTTJWF EFCU XF BHBJO UVSO UP PVS EBUB PO ,FSNBO
SNT UP DPOTUSVDU CFODINBSL DBQJUBM TUSVDUVSFT .O FTTFODF GPS FBDI JOEVTUSZ XF DBMDVMBUF UIF
TIBSF PG DBQJUBM JOWFTUNFOU OBODFE XJUI CBOL MPBOT BOE TVCUSBDU JU GSPN UIF TIBSF PG DBQJUBM
JOWFTUNFOU OBODFE XJUI CBOL MPBOT GPS UIF SNT JO PVS EBUBTFU <IJMF UIJT NFBTVSF EFQFOET PO
PUIFS DPOEJUJPOT PG UIF ,FSNBO NBSLFU JU HJWFT VT BO BQQSPYJNBUF NFBTVSF PG FYDFTT MFWFSBHF
<F UIFO SFHSFTT UIJT NFBTVSF PO CBOLJOH JOUFHSBUJPO JO (PMVNO  <F BMTP DPOTUSVDU BO JOEJDBUPS
WBSJBCMF FRVBM UP  GPS SNT GPS XIJDI FYDFTT MFWFSBHF JT TUSJDUMZ QPTJUJWF BOE VTF B QSPCJU SFHSFTTJPO
UP FWBMVBUF IPX JOUFSCBOL NBSLFU JOUFHSBUJPO BFDUT UIF QSPCBCJMJUZ PG OBODJOH XJUI CBOL EFCU B
TUSJDUMZ IJHIFS TIBSF PG DBQJUBM FYQFOTFT UIBO B TJNJMBS ,FSNBO SN (PMVNO    
<F BMTP BEESFTT UIF JTTVF UIBU IJHI MFWFSBHF NBZ CF PQUJNBM JG SNT PQFSBUF JO B IJHIHSPXUI
FOWJSPONFOU TVDI BT UIF POF JO DFOUSBM BOE FBTUFSO *VSPQF JO UIF MBUF !!T BOE FBSMZ T
*YDFTT MFWFSBHF DBO UIFO FJUIFS JOEJDBUF UIF BWBJMBCJMJUZ PG QSPUBCMF PQQPSUVOJUJFT PS UIF EFTJSF PG
JOWFTUPST UP QSFWFOU FOUSFODIFE NBOBHFST GSPN NBLJOH UPP SJTLZ JOWFTUNFOU EFDJTJPOT TFF /FOTFO
BOE 2FDLMJOH ! GPS FYBNQMF 9P BEESFTT UIBU JTTVF XF SFQFBU UIF FYFSDJTF BGUFS SFQMBDJOH
UIF ,FSNBO CFODINBSL XJUI BO JOEVTUSZ CFODINBSL CBTFE PO UIF OBODJOH QBUUFSOT PG .SJTI SNT
(PMVNOT  .SFMBOE XBT B TJNJMBSMZ IJHIHSPXUI DPVOUSZ PWFS UIF TBNF QFSJPE BOE JO GBDU
JU IBE IJHIFS BWFSBHF ,)5 HSPXUI UIBO BMM PUIFS DPVOUSJFT JO UIF EBUBTFU
9IF SFTVMUT HJWF TPNF FWJEFODF UP UIF UPPRVJDLMZUPPGBS IZQPUIFTJT 3BNFMZ XF OE UIBU
FYDFTT MFWFSBHF JODSFBTFT XJUI JOUFHSBUJPO BOE UIBU UIF QSPCBCJMJUZ PG IBWJOH B QPTJUJWF FYDFTT
MFWFSBHF JODSFBTFT XJUI JOUFHSBUJPO BT XFMM .O QBSUJDVMBS JG JOUFHSBUJPO JODSFBTFT CZ UXP TUBOEBSE
EFWJBUJPOT UIF QSPCBCJMJUZ UIBU B SN JT PWFSMFWFSBHFE WJT	 BWJT UIF MFWFSBHF PG B TJNJMBS ,FSNBO
SN JODSFBTFT CZ  BOE CZ  WJT	 BWJT B TJNJMBS .SJTI SN .NQPSUBOUMZ UIF SN BOE ZFBS
YFE FFDU JOUFSBDUJPOT JO UIF SFHSFTTJPO NBLF TVSF UIBU UIFTF SFTVMUT BSF OPU ESJWFO CZ NPSF TIBMMPX
FRVJUZ NBSLFUT JO DFOUSBM BOE FBTUFSO *VSPQF <F SFBE UIJT BT FWJEFODF UIBU JOEFFE TPNF SNT XFSF
UFNQUFE JOUP FYDFTT CBOL EFCU CZ SBQJEMZ GBMMJOH SBUFT PO CVTJOFTT MPBOT 9IJT JT JNQPSUBOU FWJEFODF
UIBU NBOZ SNT JO DFOUSBM BOE FBTUFSO *VSPQF XFSF PWFSMFWFSBHFE BOE PWFSEFQFOEFOU PO CBOL MPBOT29
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relatively early in the build-up to the 2007-2008 crisis. Rapid interbank market integration led to
￿rm overleveraging even relative to similar ￿rms in comparable high-growth countries. Given the
severity of the credit crunch in central and eastern Europe, our evidence points to one particular
channel via which rapid pre-crisis integration may have contributed to the ￿rms’ woes during the
crisis.
5 Conclusion
Using direct indicators of corporate needs for bank credit, constraints in obtaining it, and rates on
actual loans, we investigate the e￿ects of the integration in interbank markets on small ￿rm ￿nance.
We employ a sample of 6;047 ￿rms from 10 new EU member states and 4 euro zone countries. We
construct a measure of the degree of long-run convergence of nominal yields in national interbank
markets to yields in the German benchmark interbank market. For robustness purposes, we also
look at volumes of cross-country interbank loans and deposits. We pursue an identi￿cation strategy
by distinguishing across ￿rms’ and industries’ natural dependence on bank ￿nance. We account
for any selection biases by using information on ￿rms without bank loans. We also account for the
structure of the banking sector.
Our ￿ndings imply that interbank market integration alleviates credit constraints and decreases
loan rates. A deepening of integration by two standard deviations would decrease loan rates by
121 basis points, after selection bias is accounted for. These e￿ects only hold in countries with
a considerable degree of credit market competition. Hence interbank market integration has a
pronounced e￿ect on real loan rates and credit market competition has a strong impact on the size
of this e￿ect. Our ￿ndings have important implications for current events and policy responses
in the European ￿nancial markets which may have decreased the degree of ￿nancial integration.
They also provide food for thought for policy makers that devise measures a￿ecting banking sector
consolidation .
We also ￿nd some evidence that the rapid convergence of interbank rates, resulting in a rapid
decrease in rates on loans to business ￿rms, may have induced ￿rms to take on excess leverage.30
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<IJMF UIF QPTJUJWF FFDU PG JOUFHSBUJPO JO NBLJOH CBOL MPBOT DIFBQFS BOE JOEVDJOH SNT UP TIJGU
BXBZ GSPN NPSF FYQFOTJWF GPSNT PG OBODF JT CFZPOE EPVCU PVS FWJEFODF BMTP TVHHFTUT UIBU SNT
JO NBSLFUT XIJDI JOUFHSBUFE UPP RVJDLMZ NBZ IBWF UBLFO PO B IJHIFS TIBSF PG CBOL EFCU UIBO JT
OBUVSBM BT JNQMJFE CZ UIF OBODJOH QBUUFSO PG CFODINBSL SNT 9IJT TVHHFTUT UIBU NBOZ DFOUSBM
BOE FBTU *VSPQFBO SNT NBZ IBWF FOUFSFE UIF   OBODJBM DSJTJT PWFSMFWFSBHFE QBSUJBMMZ
EVF UP UIF SBQJE QBDF PG QSFDSJTJT CBOLJOH JOUFHSBUJPO31
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Appendix. A three-stage Tobit model
The demand for any asset can be derived in a general portfolio choice model in which ￿rms
maximize their expected pro￿ts subject to a lifetime budget constraint. The supply of an asset can
be derived from pro￿t maximization by banks { subject to the constraint that the sum of assets
and liabilities does not exceed net worth { accounting for the degree of competition. Dicks-Mireaux
and King (1982) and Cox and Jappelli (1993) for example estimate the demand for credit. The
equilibrium ￿rm debt is modelled conditional on the ￿rm holding a positive amount of debt and
being unconstrained in the credit market. The supply of funds is not explicitly modeled in these
papers. We model the terms on the bank loans we observe conditional on ￿rms holding some debt
and being unconstrained. We control for ￿rm characteristics and account for the borrowing and
lending conditions that banks face in interbank markets as well as for the structure of the banking
sector.
We employ a three-equation generalized Tobit model. We assume that loan rates, Y ￿
ijt, on a
loan to ￿rm i in country j at time t, which are observable to us, are a linear function of ￿rm i
variables Xi and country j variables Zj at time t:
Y ￿
ijt = X1it￿1 + Zjt￿2 + "1ijt (6)
"1ijt is a random component which varies at the ￿rm, country and time level that is normally
distributed with mean 0 and variance ￿2
1. Y ￿
it is observed only if the demand for debt is positive
and the ￿rm is not credit constrained.
Let the dummy variable Q equals 1 if the ￿rm desires positive bank credit and equals 0 otherwise.
The value of Q is in turn determined by the latent variable:
q = X2it￿1 + Zjt￿2 + "2it (7)
where X2it contains the values of X1it and other supplementary variables that may e￿ect the
￿rm’s ￿xed costs and convenience associated with using bank credit. The variable Q = 1 if q > 0
and Q = 0 otherwise. The error "2it is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ￿2
2.32
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'BOL MPBO SBUFT BSF POMZ PCTFSWBCMF XIFO SNT BDUVBMMZ SFDFJWF MPBOT .NQMJDJUMZ UIF NPEFM
BTTVNFT UIBU B MPBO JT SFDFJWFE JG UIF SN OFFET B MPBO BQQMJFT GPS JU BOE UIF BQQMJDBUJPO JT OPU
SFKFDUFE CZ UIF CBOL JF UIF SN JT OPU DSFEJU DPOTUSBJOFE *RVBUJPO  BEESFTTFT UIF STU
QBSU PG UIJT DPOEJUJPO CVU OPU UIF TFDPOE 8PNF SNT NBZ OFFE UP IBWF B TUSJDUMZ QPTJUJWF BNPVOU
PG CBOL EFCU CVU BSF DPOTUSBJOFE JO UIFJS BDDFTT UP CBOL OBODJOH <F BTTVNF UIBU TVDI DSFEJU
DPOTUSBJOUT UBLF UIF GPSN PG B CJOBSZ DPOTUSBJOU XIJDI JT SNTQFDJD '**58 NBLFT JU QPTTJCMF UP
EJSFDUMZ FTUJNBUF UIBU DPOTUSBJOU BT UIF TVSWFZ BTLT SNT BCPVU UIFJS SFBTPOT GPS OPU BQQMZJOH BOE
UIFJS FYQFSJFODF JO HFOFSBM XJUI CBOL MPBOT (POTUSBJOUT PO PCUBJOJOH DSFEJU NBZ CF B GVODUJPO PG
SN BOE CBOL DIBSBDUFSJTUJDT &T XF EP OPU PCTFSWF UIF CBOL UIBU JT BDUVBMMZ HSBOUJOH UIF MPBO
XF FNQMPZ UIF DIBSBDUFSJTUJDT PG UIF DPVOUSZT CBOLJOH TFDUPS BT B QSPYZ
<F EFOF B SN UP CF DSFEJU DPOTUSBJOFE JG JU OFFET DSFEJU CVU EJE OPU SFDFJWF BOZ CBOL MPBO
.G UIF SN PCUBJOT B CBOL MPBO JU JT VODPOTUSBJOFE :OMJLF TUVEJFT PO DPOTVNFS EFCU XIJDI BSF
JOUFSFTUFE JO UIF EJFSFODF CFUXFFO EFTJSFE BOE BDUVBM EFCU -BZBTIJ ! # (PY BOE /BQQFMMJ
!! XF BSF NBJOMZ JOUFSFTUFE JO UIF MPBO SBUF BDDPVOUJOH GPS PUIFS MPBO UFSNT TVDI BT NBUVSJUZ
BOE DPMMBUFSBM -FODF XF EFOF B EVNNZ WBSJBCMF  XIJDI FRVBMT  JG UIF SN JT VODPOTUSBJOFE
BOE FRVBMT  PUIFSXJTF 9IF MBUFOU WBSJBCMF GPS  EFQFOET PO UIF EFUFSNJOBOUT PG EFTJSFE DSFEJU"




 	  
	 JT B WFDUPS PG SNMFWFM WBSJBCMFT UIBU NBZ EFUFSNJOF UIF EFNBOE GPS EFCU BOEQ S P Y J F T
GPS UIF UJNFWBSJBOU SFMFWBOU DIBSBDUFSJTUJDT PG UIF CBOLJOH TFDUPS  $J G BOE  $
PUIFSXJTF

 JT UIF JOWFSTF 2JMMT SBUJP FTUJNBUFE GSPN FRVBUJPO  -FDLNBO !! 9IF FSSPS
	 JT OPSNBMMZ EJTUSJCVUFE XJUI NFBO  BOE WBSJBODF 	

.O UFSNT PG UJNJOH PG UIF HBNF XF BTTVNF UIBU UIF SN STU BQQMJFT GPS B MPBO JG JU EFTJSFT
QPTJUJWF CBOL EFCU BOE JU SFDFJWFT POF JG JU JT VODPOTUSBJOFE 9IJT QSPDFEVSF BMMPXT VT UP EJTUJOHVJTI
CFUXFFO GPVS EJFSFOU SFHJNFT TQFDJFE CZ UIF MBUFOU WBSJBCMFT  BOE "  SNT UIBU EP OPU OFFE
CBOL DSFEJU BOE BSF DPOTUSBJOFE  $  $   SNT UIBU EP OPU OFFE CBOL DSFEJU BOE BSF
VODPOTUSBJOFE  $ $   SNT UIBU OFFE CBOL DSFEJU CVU BSF DPOTUSBJOFE  $ $  33
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BOE  VODPOTUSBJOFE SNT XJUI QPTJUJWF CBOL DSFEJU  $  $  9IF FTUJNBUJPO TUSBUFHZ
GPMMPXT -FDLNBO !! <F VTF UIF PCTFSWFE JOGPSNBUJPO GPS BMM SNT JO PSEFS UP FMJNJOBUF UIF
CJBT JOEVDFE CZ UIF MFGUUSVODBUJPO PG PVS TBNQMF UP SNT UIBU OFFE BOE PCUBJO CBOL DSFEJU -FODF
XIJMF JU JT UIF MBUUFS HSPVQ UIBU XF BSF JOUFSFTUFE JO XF JODPSQPSBUF JOGPSNBUJPO GSPN UIF STU
UISFF HSPVQT UP FMJNJOBUF UIF TQFDJDBUJPO FSSPS JOEVDFE CZ UIJT TBNQMF TFMFDUJPO CJBT &T UP
UIF FYBDU FTUJNBUJPO TFRVFODF XF STU FTUJNBUF UIF DSFEJUEFTJSBCJMJUZ FRVBUJPO PO UIF GVMM TBNQMF
UIFO UIF BCTFODFPGCPSSPXJOHDPOTUSBJOU FRVBUJPO PO UIF TVCTBNQMF PG SNT UIBU EFTJSF TUSJDUMZ
QPTJUJWF EFCU BOE OBMMZ UIF MPBOSBUF FRVBUJPO PO UIF TVCTBNQMF PG SNT XJUI TUSJDUMZ QPTJUJWF
EFCU JODPSQPSBUJOH UIF JOGPSNBUJPO GSPN UIF UXP TFMFDUJPO FRVBUJPOT
9IF FYQFDUBUJPO PG UIF DPTU PG CBOL DSFEJU GPS UIF GPVSUI HSPVQ PG SNT JT"
 
	 $ $ $	  	  		 	$ $   ! 
:TJOH UIF EJTUSJCVUJPO PG UIF FSSPS UFSNT EFOFE BCPWF BOE UIF TUBOEBSE QSPCJU OPSNBMJ[BUJPO
	
 $ 	
 $  POF DBO PCUBJO DPOTJTUFOU FTUJNBUFT PG  BOE  VQ UP B GBDUPS PG QSPQPSUJPOBMJUZ 1FU
 BOE  JOEJDBUF UIF TJNQMF DPSSFMBUJPO CFUXFFO  BOE  BOE CFUXFFO  BOE  SFTQFDUJWFMZ
-FODF UIF OBM FTUJNBUJPO QSPDFEVSF FNQMPZFE DBO CF XSJUUFO BT"
 






 JT UIF JOWFSTF 2JMMT SBUJPT 9IF QSPCBCJMJUZ PG CFJOH JO UIF TBNQMF PG PCTFSWFE MPBOT JT
  
3FYU XF TQFDJGZ UIF NPEFM JO UFSNT PG PVS WBSJBCMFT PG JOUFSFTU 9IF DSFEJUEFTJSBCJMJUZ FRVBUJPO
DPOUBJOT SN WBSJBCMFT XIJDI DPOUBJO JOGPSNBUJPO BCPVU IPX MJLFMZ JU JT UIBU UIF SN XJMM OFFE
CBOL DSFEJU" NFBTVSFT PG JOUFHSBUJPO JO UIF CBOLJOH TFDUPS PXOFSTIJQ TUSVDUVSF JOEJWJEVBMGBNJMZ
QSJWBUFHPWFSONFOU PS EPNFTUJDGPSFJHO PXOFSTIJQ PXOFSTIJQ IJTUPSZ QSJWBUJ[FE PS PSJHJOBMMZ
QSJWBUF JG OPU HPWFSONFOU PXOFE XIFUIFS UIF SN FYQPSUT XIFUIFS UIF SN SFDFJWFT TVCTJEJFT
	1<=G A5M 5F=G9 :CF 9L5AD@9 K<9B ;CC8 FAG GMGH9A5H=75@@M G9@97H H<9AG9@J9G CIH C: H<9 5DD@=75H=CB DFC79GG =B
ACF9 =BH9;F5H98 A5F?9HG &B H<=G 75G9 H<9 ,)0 9GH=A5H9 C: H<9 HFI9 F9@5H=CBG<=D 69HK99B @C5B F5H9G 5B8 =BH9;F5H=CB
K=@@ 69 6=5G98 HCK5F8G N9FC34
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GSPN BOZ CSBODI PG HPWFSONFOU BOE XIFUIFS JU JT TVCKFDU UP TUSPOH DPNQFUJUJPO JO QSPEVDU NBSLFUT
<F BMTP VTF B QSPYZ GPS SN TJ[F XIFSF UIF SN JT EFOFE BT TNBMM JG JU IBT MFTT UIBO  FNQMPZFFT
NFEJVN JG JU IBT CFUXFFO  BOE  FNQMPZFFT BOE MBSHF JG JU IBT NPSF UIBO  FNQMPZFFT +JOBMMZ
ZFBS BOE DPVOUSZ EVNNJFT BSF JODMVEFE UP BDDPVOU GPS UIF QPTTJCJMJUZ UIBU EFTJSFE CBOL DSFEJU JT
B GVODUJPO PG UJNFWBSZJOH NBDSPFDPOPNJD BOE DPOTUBOU DPVOUSZ DIBSBDUFSJTUJDT 9IF FYDMVTJPO
SFTUSJDUJPO SFRVJSFT UIBU UIFSF JT BU MFBTU POF NPSF WBSJBCMF JO UIF TFU PG JOEFQFOEFOU WBSJBCMFT JO
*RVBUJPO  UIBO JO *RVBUJPO   BOE BU MFBTU POF NPSF WBSJBCMF JO UIF TFU PG JOEFQFOEFOU WBSJBCMFT
JO *RVBUJPO   UIBO JO *RVBUJPO 35
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1252
October 2010
References
[1] Agenor, P.-R., 2003. Bene￿ts and costs of international ￿nancial integration: Theory and facts.
The World Economy 26, 1089-1118.
[2] Baele, L., Ferrando, A., H￿ ordahl, P., Krylova, E., Monnet, C., 2004. Measuring ￿nancial
integration in the euro area. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 20, 509-30.
[3] Beer, C., Ongena, S., Peter, M., 2010. Borrowing in foreign currency: Austrian households as
carry traders. Journal of Banking & Finance 34. 2198-2211.
[4] Berger, A., Klapper, L., Udell, G., 2001. The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque
small businesses. Journal of Banking & Finance 25, 2127{2167.
[5] Brown, M., Ongena, S., Yesin, P., 2008. Currency denomination of bank loans: Evidence from
small ￿rms in transition countries. Discussion Paper 2008-16, Tilburg University.
[6] Brown, M., Jappelli, T., Pagano, M., 2009. Information sharing and credit: Firm-level evidence
from transition countries. Journal of Financial Intermediation 18, 151-172.
[7] Brown, M., Rueda Maurer, M., Pak, T., Tynaev, N., 2009. Banking sector reform and interest
rates in transition economies: Bank-level evidence from Kyrgyzstan. Journal of Banking &
Finance 33, 1677-1687.
[8] Chakravarty, S., Yilmazer, T., 2009. A multistage model of loans and the role of relationships.
Financial Management 38, 781-816.
[9] Cox, D., Jappelli, T., 1993. The e￿ect of borrowing constraints on consumer liabilities. Journal
of Money, Banking and Credit 25, 197-213.
[10] Cu~ nat, V., 2007. Trade credit: suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers. Review of
Financial Studies 20, 491-527.
[11] de la Torre, A., Mart￿ ￿nez Per￿ ￿a, M.S., Schmukler, S., 2010. Bank involvement with SMEs:
Beyond relationship lending. Journal of Banking & Finance 34, 2280{2293.36
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1252
October 2010
@A )F -BBT 7 +FSSFJSB ) 9BDJ &  <IBU EFUFSNJOFT UIF DPNQPTJUJPO PG CBOLT MPBO
QPSUGPMJPT% *WJEFODF GSPN USBOTJUJPO DPVOUSJFT /PVSOBM PG 'BOLJOH  +JOBODF    ! 
@A )FHSZTF - 0JN 2 4OHFOB 8 ! 2JDSPFDPOPNFUSJDT PG 'BOLJOH 4YGPSE :OJWFSTJUZ
5SFTT" 3FX >PSL
@A )FNZBOZL > 4TUFSHBBSE ( 8SFOTFO '  :8 CBOLJOH EFSFHVMBUJPO TNBMM CVTJOFTTFT
BOE JOUFSTUBUF JOTVSBODF PG QFSTPOBM JODPNF /PVSOBM PG +JOBODF   
@A )JDLT2JSFBVY 1 0JOH 2 !  &TTFU IPMEJOHT BOE UIF MJGF DZDMF *DPOPNJD /PVSOBM !

@A *EJTPO - / 1FWJOF 7 7JDDJ 1 8MPL 9  .OUFSOBUJPOBM OBODJBM JOUFHSBUJPO BOE
FDPOPNJD HSPXUI /PVSOBM PG .OUFSOBUJPOBM 2POFZ BOE +JOBODF  !
@A *OHMF 7 ,SBOHFS ( !  (PJOUFHSBUJPO BOE FSSPS DPSSFDUJPO" 7FQSFTFOUBUJPO FTUJNBUJPO
BOE UFTUJOH *DPOPNFUSJDB  
@ A +B[[BSJ 8 -VCCBSE 7 5FUFSTFO ' !   +JOBODJOH DPOTUSBJOUT BOE DPSQPSBUF JOWFTUNFOU
'SPPLJOH 5BQFST PO *DPOPNJD &DUJWJUZ ! 
@!A +FDIU + ,S^ VOFS -5 -BSUNBOO 5  <FMGBSF FFDUT PG OBODJBM JOUFHSBUJPO (*57
)JTDVTTJPO 5BQFS 3P 
@A +SFJYBT = -PMUIBVTFO (  .OUFSCBOL NBSLFU JOUFHSBUJPO VOEFS BTZNNFUSJD JOGPSNBUJPO
7FWJFX PG +JOBODJBM 8UVEJFT   !!
@A ,JBOOFUUJ 2 4OHFOB 8 ! +JOBODJBM JOUFHSBUJPO BOE FOUSFQSFOFVSJBM BDUJWJUZ  FWJEFODF
GSPN GPSFJHO CBOL FOUSZ JO FNFSHJOH NBSLFUT 7FWJFX PG +JOBODF   
@A -BZBTIJ + !  9IF QFSNBOFOU JODPNF IZQPUIFTJT" *TUJNBUJPO BOE UFTUJOH CZ JOTUSVNFOUBM
WBSJBCMFT /PVSOBM PG 5PMJUJDBM *DPOPNZ !  !!
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@A .NCT /  9IF SFBM FFDUT PG OBODJBM JOUFHSBUJPO /PVSOBM PG .OUFSOBUJPOBM *DPOPNJDT  
!
@A .WBTIJOB ; 8DIBSGTUFJO )  'BOL MFOEJOH EVSJOH UIF OBODJBM DSJTJT PG   /PVSOBM PG
+JOBODJBM *DPOPNJDT ! ! 
@A /FOTFO 2 2FDLMJOH < ! 9IFPSZ PG UIF SN" 2BOBHFSJBM CFIBWJPS BHFODZ DPTUT BOE
PXOFSTIJQ TUSVDUVSF /PVSOBM PG +JOBODJBM *DPOPNJDT  
@A 0MFJO 2 ! & UIFPSZ PG UIF CBOLJOH SN /PVSOBM PG 2POFZ (SFEJU BOE 'BOLJOH 
 
@ A 4CTUGFME 2 !  (BQJUBM NPCJMJUZ JO UIF XPSME FDPOPNZ" 9IFPSZ BOE NFBTVSFNFOU JO UIF
3BUJPOBM 'VSFBV NFUIPE .O 9IF 3BUJPOBM 'VSFBV 2FUIPE .OUFSOBUJPOBM (BQJUBM 2PCJMJUZ
BOE 4UIFS *TTBZT 02FMU[FS & - FET 3PSUI -PMMBOE" &NTUFSEBN
@!A 5FUFSTFO 2 7BKBO 7 !! 9IF FFDU PG DSFEJU NBSLFU DPNQFUJUJPO PO MFOEJOH SFMBUJPOTIJQT
9IF 6VBSUFSMZ /PVSOBM PG *DPOPNJDT  
@A 5VSJ 2 7PDIPMM / 8UFFO 8  ,MPCBM SFUBJM MFOEJOH JO UIF BGUFSNBUI PG UIF :8 OBODJBM
DSJTJT" )JTUJOHVJTIJOH CFUXFFO EFNBOE BOE TVQQMZ FFDUT /PVSOBM PG +JOBODJBM *DPOPNJDT
+PSUIDPNJOH
@A 7BKBO 7 ?JOHBMFT 1 !!  +JOBODJBM EFQFOEFODF BOE HSPXUI &NFSJDBO *DPOPNJD 7FWJFX
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Table 1 
Firm size summary statistics  
Country  Number of firms  Share small firms   Share medium firms  Share large firms 
Bulgaria 300  0.74  0.16  0.10 
Czech Republic  343  0.76  0.16  0.08 
Estonia 219  0.74  0.16  0.10 
Greece 545  0.81  0.10  0.09 
Hungary 610  0.72  0.20  0.08 
Ireland 500  0.78  0.15  0.07 
Latvia 205  0.74  0.16  0.10 
Lithuania 205  0.68  0.22  0.10 
Poland 975  0.75  0.18  0.07 
Portugal 504  0.77  0.12  0.11 
Romania 600  0.65  0.25  0.10 
Slovakia 220  0.67  0.22  0.11 
Slovenia 223  0.71  0.17  0.12 
Spain 598  0.78  0.12  0.10 
Total 6,047  0.73  0.18  0.09 
This table presents statistics on the share of small, medium, and large firms in each country. ‘Small firms’ are 
defined as firms with 2 to 49 employees; ‘Medium firms’ are defined as firms with 50 to 249 employees; ‘Large 
firms’ are defined as firms with more than 250 employees. All data are averaged over the period 1998:01 and 
2005:12. Source: BEEPS (2004, 2005). 40
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Table 4  
Panel unit root tests and engle-granger cointegration tests on model variables  
 6-month  rate  ¨ 6-month rates  6-month rate 
  Z p-value Z p-value  Z p-value 
Country (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Bulgaria  -2.55 0.10 -8.32 0.00  -5.67 0.00 
Czech  Republic  -0.97 0.76 -8.38 0.00  -1.28 0.64 
Estonia  -4.05 0.00 -2.01 0.28  -4.46 0.01 
Greece  -5.15 0.00 -5.53 0.00  -5.37 0.00 
Hungary  -0.21 0.94 -8.33 0.00  -0.35 0.92 
Ireland  -2.12 0.24 -5.18 0.00  -3.72 0.00 
Latvia  -3.64 0.01  -14.07 0.00  -4.24 0.00 
Lithuania  -1.21 0.67 -5.68 0.00  -3.49 0.01 
Poland  -0.73 0.84 -5.88 0.00  -2.21 0.20 
Portugal  -1.54 0.51 -5.92 0.00  -6.19 0.00 
Romania  -0.73 0.84 -8.38 0.00  -1.18 0.68 
Slovakia  -0.65 0.86 -6.42 0.00  -0.86 0.80 
Slovenia  -0.13 0.95 -4.43 0.00  -1.30 0.63 
Spain  -1.46 0.55 -5.55 0.00  -7.59 0.00 
All  countries    -3.24 0.02 -7.32 0.00  -3.76 0.00 
This table presents results and statistics from panel unit root tests (Columns (1)-(4)) and from Engle-Granger 









































 (Column (5)). The null hypothesis for the unit root tests is  0 : 0  
j H U  for 
all j, against the alternative  1 : 0  
j H U for some countries. The null hypothesis for the cointegration test 
assumes a unit root in the residuals of the cointegration regression, which implies absence of cointegration. The 
alternative hypothesis assumes a root of less than one. Market rates are interbank rates on 6-month instruments 
and inter-day differences in rates on 6-month instruments. The country-month values are calculated as in 
Equation (2) and the underlying data comes from the Global Financial Database. 
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Table 5  
Probit estimates: desirability of bank credit 
Variable Coefficient  Variable  mean 
6 E   -0.201 
(0.046)*** 
2.71 
6-month interbank rate  -0.095 
(0.009)*** 
7.37 
Small firm  -0.365 
(0.074)*** 
0.75 
Medium firm  -0.201 
(0.077)*** 
0.16 
Individual owner  0.056 
(0.059) 
0.78 
Government owner  -0.423 
(0.096)*** 
0.05 























Observations 5,929   
Country dummies  Yes   
Year dummies  Yes   
Firms desiring bank loan  4,507   
Log likelihood  -3,592.0   
This table presents the estimates of the probability of credit desirability based on firm- and country-level 
characteristics. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm desires bank credit. 6 E  is the estimate 
of interbank markets integration for rates on 6-month money instruments from Equation (2). In the case of firms 
without a loan, it is equal to the within-country average over 1998-2005. ‘6 month interbank rate’ is the nominal 
rate of 6-month interbank market money instruments. In the case of firms without a loan, it is equal to the 
within-country average over 1998-2005. ‘Small firm’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has from 2 to 49 
employees. ‘Medium firm’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has from 50 to 249 employees. ‘Individual owner’ 
is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owned by an individual or a family. ‘Government owner’ is a dummy equal 
to 1 if the firm is owned by a government agency. ‘Foreign owner’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the owner of the 
firm is a foreign entity. ‘Exporter’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm exports to non-local markets. ‘Privatized’ is 
a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a former state-owned company. ‘Subsidized’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm 
has received in the last 3 years subsidies from central or local government. ‘Audited’ is a dummy equal to 1 if 
the firm employs external auditing services. ‘Competition’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm faces fairly, very, 
or extremely strong competition. Ommited category in firm size is ‘Large firm’. Source: BEEPS (2004, 2005). 
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Table 6 
Probit estimates: absence of borrowing constraint
Variable Coefficient  Variable  mean 
6 E   0.085 
(0.050)* 
2.86 
6-month interbank rate  -0.007 
(0.018) 
7.75 
Small firm  -0.109 
(0.150) 
0.71 
Medium firm  -0.118 
(0.147) 
0.18 
Individual owner  -0.194 
(0.088)** 
0.76 
Government owner  0.040 
(0.166) 
0.05 





















Observations 4,507   
Country dummies  Yes   
Year dummies  Yes   
Unconstrained firms  3,697   
Log likelihood  -1,650.7   
This table presents the estimates of the probability of credit constraint based on firm- and country-level 
characteristics. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is unconstrained.  6 E  is the estimate of 
interbank markets integration for rates on 6-month money instruments from Equation (2). In the case of firms 
without a loan, it is equal to the within-country average over 1998-2005. ‘6 month interbank rate’ is the nominal 
rate of 6-month interbank market money instruments. In the case of firms without a loan, it is equal to the 
within-country average over 1998-2005. ‘Banking sector C3’ is measured as the percentage of banking sector 
assets held by the 3 largest banks; source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000, updated 2008). ‘Small 
firm’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has from 2 to 49 employees. ‘Medium firm’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
firm has from 50 to 249 employees. ‘Individual owner’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owned by an 
individual or a family. ‘Government owner’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owned by a government 
agency. ‘Foreign owner’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the owner of the firm is a foreign entity. ‘Exporter’ is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the firm exports to non-local markets. ‘Privatized’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a 
former state-owned company. ‘Subsidized’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has received in the last 3 years 
subsidies from central or local government. ‘Audited’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm employs external 
auditing services. ‘Mills1’ is the selection term from the credit desirability regression (Table 5). Ommited 
category in firm size is ‘Large firm’. Source: BEEPS (2004 and 2005).  45
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Table 7  
Interbank market integration and bank loan rates  
 Real  loan  rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
6 E   0.447 0.647 0.639 0.488  0.782  1.553 
  (0.164)*** (0.219)*** (0.220)*** (0.250)**  (0.251)***  (0.405)*** 
Interbank rate    -0.102  -0.101 -0.066  -0.071 -0.297 
   (0.061)*  (0.061)*  (0.066)  (0.075)  (0.124)** 
Loan maturity    -0.007  -0.007  -0.006  -0.007  -0.007 
   (0.002)***  (0.002)***  (0.002)***  (0.002)***  (0.002)*** 
Small Firm    0.872  0.868  1.012  0.880  0.916 
   (0.179)***  (0.179)***  (0.192)***  (0.184)***  (0.183)*** 
Medium Firm    0.211  0.217  0.108  0.189  0.104 
   (0.236)  (0.236)  (0.259)  (0.241)  (0.249) 
Individual owner    0.012  0.017  0.092  0.048  0.083 
   (0.198)  (0.198)  (0.210)  (0.203)  (0.201) 
Govern. owner    0.520  0.527  0.129  0.495  0.485 
   (0.382)  (0.382)  (0.425)  (0.492)  (0.391) 
Foreign owner    -0.120  -0.113 -0.463  -0.020 0.022 
   (0.310)  (0.310)  (0.361)  (0.317)  (0.316) 
Privatized   -0.437  -0.447 -0.490  -0.436 -0.433 
   (0.248)*  (0.249)*  (0.277)*  (0.254)*  (0.253)* 
Exporter   -0.392  -0.394 -0.428  -0.418 -0.432 
   (0.141)***  (0.141)***  (0.151)***  (0.144)***  (0.143)*** 
Audited   -0.434  -0.433 -0.315  -0.443 -0.420 
   (0.160)***  (0.160)***  (0.170)*  (0.166)***  (0.163)*** 
Mills2     0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001 
     (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Observations  1,988 1,894 1,894 1,624  1,788  1,894 
Fixed effects  Country 
 Year 
Country   
×Year 
R2  0.54 0.58 0.58 0.59  0.58 0.58 
This table presents the estimates of the rate on business loans based on firm- and country-level characteristics. 
The dependent variable is the spread of the individual nominal loan rate over the benchmark nominal money 
market rate. All estimates are from OLS regressions.  6 E  is the estimate of interbank markets integration for 
rates on 6-month money instruments from Equation (2). ‘Interbank rate’ is the nominal rate of a 6-month 
interbank market money instrument. ‘Loan maturity’ is the duration of the loan. ‘Small firm’ is a dummy equal 
to 1 if the firm has from 2 to 49 employees. ‘Medium firm’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has from 50 to 249 
employees.  ‘Individual owner’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owned by an individual or a family. 
‘Government owner’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owned by a government agency. ‘Foreign owner’ is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the owner of the firm is a foreign entity. ‘Exporter’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm 
exports to non-local markets. ‘Privatized’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a former state-owned company. 
‘Audited’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm employs external auditing services. Ommited category in firm size 
is ‘Large firm’. ‘Mills2’ is the selection term from the borrowing constraint regression (Table 6). The 
regressions exclude all Romanian firms. In Column (4), all loans in foreign currency are excluded from the 
sample. In Column (5), all loans granted before January 1, 2001 are excluded. Source: BEEPS (2004 and 2005). 46
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Table 8  
Interbank market integration and bank loan rates: Alternative measures of integration 
 
This table presents the estimates of the rate on business loans based on firm- and country-level characteristics. 
The dependent variable is the spread of the individual nominal loan rate over the benchmark nominal money 
market rate. All estimates are from OLS regressions.  3 E  is the estimate of interbank markets integration for 
rates on 3-month money instruments from Equation (2).  1 E  is the estimate of interbank markets integration for 
rates on 1-month money instruments from Equation (2). ‘MM deposits / GDP’ is the quarterly outstanding 
volume of interbank deposits of all banks in the respective country with respect to the euro area, normalized by 
GDP, both euro denominated. ‘MM loans / GDP’ is the quarterly outstanding volume of interbank loans of all 
banks in the respective country with respect to the euro area, normalized by GDP, both euro denominated. ‘MM 
deposits + loans / GDP’ is the sum of the quarterly outstanding volumes of interbank deposits and interbank 
loans of all banks in the respective country with respect to the euro area, normalized by GDP, both euro 
denominated. The regressions also include the other variables from Table 7, including Mills2 (unreported). The 
regressions exclude all Romanian firms, all loans in foreign currency, and all loans granted after January 1, 





 Real  loan  rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 




 (0.502)**         
1 E    1.178      
   (0.596)**      
MM deposits / GDP      -4.647     
     (2.733)*     
MM loans / GDP        -1.895   
      (1.106)*   
MM deposits + loans / GDP          -1.147 
       (0.630)* 
Observations  1,503 1,503 1,124 1,124  1,124 
Fixed effects  Country 
 Year 
R2  0.58 0.58 0.54 0.54  0.54 47
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Interbank market integration and bank loans rates: accounting for credit market competition
 Real  loan  rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
t E * Bank competition  0.854 0.838 -0.314 0.656 0.776 
  (0.402)** (0.403)**  (0.374)  (0.393)* (0.389)*** 
Bank  competition  -2.954 -2.890 1.006 -2.377 -2.652 
  (1.550)* (1.554)*  (0.688)  (1.489)* (1.543)* 
t E    0.077 0.096 0.603 0.141 0.142 
  (0.363)  (0.365) (0.296)*** (0.384)  (0.332) 
Heckman  correction  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1,503 1,503 1,531 1,503 1,503 
Fixed effects  Country 
 Year 
R2  0.59 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.59 
This table presents estimates of the rate on business loans based on firm- and country-level characteristics. The 
dependent variable is the spread of the individual loan rate over the benchmark money market rate.  t E  is the 
estimate of interbank markets integration for rates on 6-month money instruments in Columns (1)-(3), on 3-
month instruments in Column (4), and on 1-month instruments in Column (5), all estimated as in Equation (2). 
‘Bank competition’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the country is in the bottom half of the banking sector C3 
distribution (Columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5)), source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, “A new database on 
financial development and structure”; and a dummy equal to 1 if the sum of the squared shares of each 
individual bank’s assets out of the total banking sector assets is in the bottom half of the bank HHI distribution 
(Column (3)), source: Giannetti and Ongena (2009). The regressions also include the other variables from Table 
7, including Mills2 (unreported). The regressions exclude all Romanian firms, all loans in foreign currency, and 
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